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commercial restrictions, the evil is the unfair tax advantages that chari-
ties possess over their competitors. But absent this consideration, a
charity should be able to finance its purposes by commercial enterprises.
Again and again, restrictions are implemented based not upon proper
regulation of charities but upon collateral considerations arising from
the tax scheme itself.
At the same time, Congress cannot be expected to grant exemption
from its taxing power without establishing and supervising the criteria
for awarding those exemptions. Undeniably much of the regulation is
concerned with insuring that the charities actually serve the public. A
government has the obligation to foster the welfare of its citizens by the
most efficient constitutional means of enforcement available. In the
regulation of charities, Congress has determined this means to be the
Internal Revenue Code.
HENRY MARVIN MERCER
Medical Malpractice in North Carolina*
INTRODUCTION
The recent dramatic and highly publicized increase in the number
and size of damage awards for medical malpractice" has provoked a
nationwide storm of controversy. This development, together with an
equally precipitous drop in the number of insurance companies willing
to offer medical malpractice coverage, 2 has prompted widespread criti-
cism of the existing tort law insurance system and has brought forth
proposals for reform ranging from minor modifications of legal doctrine
and procedure to outright abolition of the current system.
In 1975, the North Carolina General Assembly established the
Professional Liability Insurance Study Commission to "make a thorough
and comprehensive study of any and all aspects of professional liability
* This Comment was prepared as a project for the North Carolina Law Center.
1. See, e.g., TIME, Mar. 24, 1975, at 62 (recoveries of $4,025,000, $300,000 and
$1,000,000 reported); NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10, 1975, at 41.
2. See Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1974, at 10, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1975, § E
at 6, col. 2. The story of the threatened withdrawal of the St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company from North Carolina is told in NORTH CAROLINA PROFESSIONAL LI-
ABmriY INSuRANCE STuDY COMMISSION REPORT 6-15 (March 12, 1976) [hereinafter
cited as STuDy REPORT].
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insurance" and to report its recommendations by March 15, 1976.3 The
Study Commission has now released a report of its findings and recom-
mendations, 4 which, in many respects, seem designed to ease the pres-
sure on health care providers in North Carolina by narrowing the scope
of their legal liability. 5 This investigation of North Carolina's medical
malpractice problem is designed to supplement the Study Commission's
report, and to add to the public's and the General Assembly's under-
standing of this important problem.
The first of the three sections of the comment explores the law of
malpractice in North Carolina, compares it to that of other jurisdictions
and analyzes proposed changes in the North Carolina scheme that seek
to reduce the costs of medical malpractice by narrowing the legal duty of
a physician to his patients. The second section examines proposals that
would reduce the severity of awards either directly by limiting their size
or by changing the system by which they are made in the hope of
reducing the cost of litigation. Several of these proposals involve funda-
mental changes in the jury trial system of litigating disputes over medi-
cal injuries. While the Study Commission found that fundamental
reforms of this nature were not necessary in North Carolina, such an
examination seems appropriate in light of the possibility of more severe
problems in the future. The third section briefly reports the results of a
survey of North Carolina lawyers conducted by the North Carolina Law
Review. The survey sought to determine whether North Carolina law-
yers screen malpractice claims to prevent clearly frivolous cases from
coming to court, to identify the North Carolina "malpractice bar," if
such a group exists, and to discover whether the state's attorneys believe
that there are legal doctrines peculiar to the malpractice area that tend to
favor either the patient or the physician.
The malpractice problem can be analyzed as the sum of four
separate components: the increasing frequency of claims," the growth
3. Law of June 16, 1975, ch. 623, [1975] N.C. Sess. Laws 749. The Commission
was composed of twelve members selected by the Speaker of the House and the Lieuten-
ant Governor. The enabling act specified that the Commission contain two representa-
tives of insurance companies and two health professionals. The other eight members
were drawn equally from the membership of the House and Senate. Id.
4. See STUDY REPORT, supra note 2.
5. See STrUY REPORT, supra note 2, at 39 (Minority Report). Many of the Leg-
islative Commission's recommendations were first proposed by the North Carolina Med-
ical Society in a brochure, Professional Liability Insurance, signed by the president,
James E. Davis, M.D. [hereinafter cited as N.C.M.S. Brochure].
6. See Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine,
1971 DuKE L.J. 939, 940 n.4.
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in the number and magnitude of successful claims, the rising expense
and delay associated with jury trials of complicated medical malpractice
cases, 7 and the actuarial problems of computing proper insurance rates.,
The impact of each component on the total problem is not equal: for
instance, in North Carolina, the greatest problems appear to be actuarial
and not medical or legal.' However, proposals for reform have been
addressed to each one of these components.
To an uncertain but undeniably significant extent, the increase in
the number of claims made against health care providers in recent years
stems from adverse publicity0 and a breakdown of the traditional
doctor-patient relationship.' Many physicians and some lawyers have
suggested that the frequency of claims could be significantly reduced
merely by eliminating the publicity surrounding both malpractice claims
and actual acts of medical negligence. 2 Other commentators argue
that the best way to curb the rise in claims is to cut down on the number
of negligently caused medical injuries.' 3 They propose peer oversight
and review, improvements in physician education, the elimination of
7. A 1974 article estimated that medical malpractice litigation cost two billion
dollars per year in legal fees. Welch, PSRO's-Pros and Cons, 290 NnW ENo. J. MED.
1319, 1321 (1974), cited in Note, Comparative Liability for Medical Maloccurrences,
84 YALE L.J. 1141 n.5 (1975). In an interview with the Yale Law Journal on January
29, 1975, Gerald Rosenthal, Director of Health Services Research, United States Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare, stated that malpractice litigation may now cost
between five and six billion dollars annually. Note, 84 YALE L.J., supra, at 1141 n.5.
8. See generally STATE OF NEW YoRK, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL
ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 4 (1976) [hereinafter cited as NEw YoRK REPORT].
9. This conclusion was made by a representative of the St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Company before a hearing of the North Carolina Professional Liabil-
ity Insurance Study Commission (hereinafter the Legislative Commission) on October
17, 1975, at Raleigh, North Carolina. At this hearing the St. Paul spokesman said his
company was entirely satisfied with the legal doctrines relating to malpractice in North
Carolina and that his company would not suggest any changes in the current system out-
side of the insurance regulatory field. St. Paul's share of the North Carolina medical
malpractice insurance market was about ninety percent in 1974. STUDY REPORT, supra
note 2, at 6.
10. Byrnes, Media and Medical Malpractice, in HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: APPENDIX 653 (1973) (the Appendix to this
Report hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S REPORT: APPENDIX).
11. See HEW, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE at 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRETARY'S REPORT].
12. E.g., Averbach, Rx for Malpractice, 19 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 20, 23, 24, 26
(1970). See N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
13. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 51 et seq. 'The inescapable fact is that
most malpractice claims would never be filed if the patient had not been injured in the
first place." Id. at 24. See also id. at 51-65. One respondent to the North Carolina
Law Review's survey wrote that "[t]here are an unbelievable number of mistakes made
by physicians. . . . No one wants to state the obvious, but why can't some writer on
this subject at least mention it?" (emphasis in original).
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unfit practitioners,14 and a reduction in the large number of unnecessary
medical procedures performed in the United States each year. 5
Evidence suggests, however, that the recent increase in awards is
more than proportional to the expansion in the number of claims made,
and many persons charge that both of these phenomena are related to
the development of legal doctrines that are either unfair to doctors or at
least inappropriate to medical malpractice."0 Proposals to narrow the
scope of the substantive law of tort liability are intended to reduce
malpractice insurance costs by reducing the number of successful claims
against health care providers. High awards are also directly attacked by
proposals to place limits on the amount recoverable by an injured
patient.
Dissatisfaction with the expense, delay and non-professionalism of
the jury system as a method of deciding medical malpractice claims has
led to many proposals for procedural alternatives to litigation. These
alternatives may assume the role of mere adjuncts to the litigation
process, such as screening panels, or may constitute true alternatives,
such as arbitration.
The realm of actuarial science is beyond the competence of the
authors, and an analysis of the various proposals for change in the
medical malpractice liability insurance system is beyond the scope of this
comment.' 7 However, a study commissioned by the New York Legisla-
ture has concluded that a switchover from an "occurence basis" policy to
a "claims made" policy and a reduction in the statute of limitations for
malpractice claims, two of the most frequently made suggestions for
reform in this field, will have little long run ameliorative effect.'
8
I. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA
AND PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS
One frequent criticism of the development of the law of medical
malpractice is that it has unreasonably expanded the scope of liability
14. In a recent series of articles the New York Times concluded that the traditional
reluctance of physicians and surgeons to report colleagues who are known to be incom-
petent still exists and is "perhaps the greatest obstacle to better regulation of the medical
profession." N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
15. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
16. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 21 et seq.; STUDY REPORT, supra note
2, at 6.
17. For a general discussion of this problem, see NEw YORK REPORT, supra note
8; SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 41-44; Kendall and Haldi, The Medical Mal-
practice Insurance Market, in SECRETARY'S REPORT: APPENDIX, supra note 10, at 494.
18. NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
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applicable to health care providers. Many physicians and other observ-
ers contend that recent judicial decisions have failed to recognize that
the risk of adverse medical outcomes inevitably accompanies the appli-
cation of increasingly sophisticated medical technology.Y° Another con-
cern is that these decisions compel physicians to practice "defensive
medicine."
Certainly there are decisions that seem to go to great lengths to find
liability. For example, in Helling v. Carey,2 ° the Supreme Court of
Washington, in the face of unanimous expert medical testimony and a
jury verdict for defendants, held two ophthalmologists negligent as a
matter of law for failing to administer to plaintiff a pressure test
designed to detect glaucoma. Such tests were not normally given to
patients who, like plaintiff, were less than forty years old. Plaintiff in
Helling suffered severe injury as a result of the failure of defendants to
detect the disease at an early stage. The Washington court held that
since a glaucoma test is simple, inexpensive and harmless, the physicians
were negligent for failing to administer it irrespective of the usual
practice in the profession.
While the Helling case reaches a questionable result, 21 such ex-
treme cases do not justify wholesale changes in legal doctrine designed
to stack the deck against the plaintiff-patient. Cases such as Helling are
unusual; no comparable North Carolina case has been found. Moreo-
ver, it seems clear that changes in substantive tort law do not go to the
heart of the problem: the costliness, actuarial uncertainty and delay
inherent in the tort insurance system.2 2 These major problems suggest
that consideration should be given to fundamental reforms that dispense
with the tort system's reliance on negligence as the determinant of
liability. If the legislature determines that the tort system is worth
preserving in either the short or the long run, then modifications of tort
19. See, e.g., NEw Yobx REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
20. 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
21. Helling may well have gone too far but it seems clear that the courts must re-
tain the right to determine that the standard practice in the profession is negligent. If
action in accordance with the standards of the profession always precluded a finding of
liability, the injured patient and the public would have no recourse against standard prac-
tices that were in fact negligent. Certainly a court should be hesitant to declare the
standard practices of the medical profession negligent, especially when technical issues
and judgments are involved, but it must retain the power to do so. Apparently the Study
Commission's proposed statutory definition of the standard of care would remove this
power from the courts. For a discussion of standard of care, see text accompanying
notes 23-46 infra.




law designed to remedy any biases toward either party are justifiable.
The elimination of such biases might tend to make malpractice insur-
ance less risky, and consequently less expensive. To move beyond the
elimination of any such biases toward "stacking the deck" against the
plaintiff-patient would subvert the goals of the tort liability system, i.e.,
to deter negligence and to compensate the victims of negligence. Con-
sequently, this analysis assumes that if we retain the fault system our
goal should be to make that system as fair as possible to both parties.
While modifications designed to limit premium increases are desirable,
they should not be obtained at the cost of undue restrictions of claim-
ants' rights. If such modifications cannot strike an acceptable balance,
then the time has come to consider more fundamental changes in the
present system.
A. Standard of Care
The standard of care required of health care providers has been
well established in North Carolina for many years.23 It has been
articulated as follows:
A physician or surgeon who undertakes to render professional serv-
ices must meet these requirements: (1) He must possess the degree
of professional learning, skill and ability which others similarly
situated ordinarily possess; (2) he must exercise reasonable care
and diligence in the application of his knowledge and skill to the
patient's case; and (3) he must use his best judgment in the treat-
ment and care of his patient.
24
When a physician2 5 meets these three requirements he will not be held
liable for any untoward consequences. 26  When a physician fails to
meet any one of these requirements, he will be liable for any injury or
damage that is proximately caused by that failure.2 7  It is clear that a
physician will not be held liable for an honest error in judgment.
28
23. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium, 234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d 57 (1951);
Wilson v. Martin Memorial Hosp., 232 N.C. 362, 61 S.E.2d 102 (1950); Smith v.
McClung, 201 N.C. 648, 161 S.E. 91 (1931); Nash v. Royster, 189 N.C. 408, 127 S.E.
356 (1925); Long v. Austin, 153 N.C. 508, 69 S.E. 500 (1910).
24. Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 521-22, 88 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1955) (citations
omitted).
25. Throughout this discussion the term "physician" is used to mean any medical,
dental or health care provider.
26. 242 N.C. at 522, 88 S.E.2d at 765.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Belk v. Schweizer, 268 N.C. 50, 149 S.E.2d 565 (1966); Kennedy
v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 365, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).
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North Carolina's statement of the standard of care is a typical
one.29 The New York rule, for example, is that a physician must (1)
possess the degree of learning and skill of other physicians in the
locality, (2) apply that skill with reasonable care and diligence and (3)
exercise his best judgment in the application of his skill and knowl-
edge.30 These standards of care for malpractice cases are essentially
equivalent to that which is applied in any ordinary negligence case:
reasonable care under the circumstances. One such "circumstance" in
a malpractice case is the physician's implied claim that he is a profes-
sional with the skill, learning and ability of other similarly situated
professionals.
To enact legislation replacing the common law standard of care
with a statutory provision incorporating an essentially equivalent stan-
dard would not, of course, affect trial outcomes. Juries would receive
the same instructions and the nature of their deliberations would remain
unaltered. The one value of such a legislative enactment would be to
remove the current standard from the realm of judicial reconsideration;
only new legislation could impose a different standard of liability. While
such a guarantee of stability might justify legislative action, one must
recall that the North Carolina common law standard has remained
stable for many years.31 Consequently, it is very unlikely that such a
statute would have a significant effect upon the development of the law
of malpractice in North Carolina.
One liability-restricting option for North Carolina is, of course, to
provide for a major change in the standard of care required of physi-
cians. For example, the legislature could limit liability for malpractice
to cases involving gross, rather than ordinary, negligence. But this
approach subverts the two basic goals of the tort system: to deter
negligence and to compensate victims of negligence. Moreover, it
provides physicians with a degree of insulation from the consequences of
their negligence that is not enjoyed by other groups. As such, the
adoption of a more stringent standard for establishing liability seems ill-
advised. Such an action, even if it would significantly reduce the cost of
malpractice to physicians, would impose enormous limitations on in-
jured patients' rights. It is preferable to abolish the fault system of
29. See, e.g., BLACK'S IAw DIcIoNARY 1111 (4th ed. rev. 1968); W. PROSSER, Tmn
LAW OF TORTS 161-63 (4th ed. 1971); SECRETARY'S REPORT: APPENDIX, supra note 10,
at 155.
30. Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N.Y. 201, 49 N.E. 760 (1898).
31. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
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liability altogether rather than to shift the costs of that system from
negligent physicians to injured patients.
A less drastic alternative is to enact an intermediate standard of
care for physicians that incorporates relatively minor modifications of
the current standard designed to reduce the incidence of physician
liability. If the modifications are fair and reasonable, such a statute
might have considerable appeal. Study of the malpractice problem
suggests, however, that such minor modifications may not have any
impact on the result in particular cases. One of the major criticisms of
the tort liability system is that, while it is theoretically founded upon
negligence, it often operates in practice as a system of compensation,
without regard to negligence. 2 If sympathetic juries actually seek to
compensate injured patients rather than to discern negligence, then
minor modifications in the standards that those juries are asked to apply
will not significantly alter outcomes. Perhaps such changes would
increase the frequency with which trial judges could take cases from the
jury, but such instances would be infrequent in a system that pays
considerable deference to the jury as the finder of fact. Furthermore,
judges can be as sympathetic to injured patients as are juries. Indeed,
in the Helling case, discussed above, Judge Utter noted in his concur-
rence that the court was in fact deciding who, "between an innocent
plaintiff and a doctor .. .who acted reasonably . . . ," should bear
the risk of injury." While Helling is an extreme case and Judge
Utter is unusually candid, the fact remains that judges and juries are
often sympathetic toward injured patients.
Beyond sympathetic judges and juries, settlement practices contrib-
ute to the tendency of a tort system to reach results grounded more upon
injury than upon negligence.34 Only ten percent of malpractice cases
ever reach a jury verdict and only one-fourth of those are won by
plaintiffs, yet nearly two-thirds of all malpractice suits that are settled
result in payment to the claimant.35 The New York Report concludes
that these statistics make it clear that "many of the claims settled reflect
adverse outcomes rather than negligence. '' 36  That is probably the
proper conclusion, but a plausible alternative explanation is that defend-
32. NEw YoRK REPORT, supra note 8, at 168-70.
33. 83 Wash. 2d at 520, 519 P.2d at 584 (1974).
34.. For a discussion of this problem, see NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 8, at 168-
70.
35. SECRETARY's REPORT, supra note 11, at 10.
36. NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 8, at 169.
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ants are willing to settle cases in which they recognize the strength of
plaintiffs claim of negligence. Still, as the New York Report argues,
the higher number of claims against well known specialists engaged in
high risk procedures suggests that results rather than fault often provide
the basis for malpractice claims.37  For example, at the time of the
hearings in New York (October, 1975) there were twenty-four suits
with total claims of sixty million dollars outstanding against New York
City's seven professors of neurosurgery.
8
While the preceding discussion suggests that minor modifications
of the standard of care will not have a significant impact on outcomes,
consideration of such modifications is clearly called for once the decision
is made to retain the present negligence approach. The North Carolina
Commission's Report has proposed that the Legislature enact the follow-
ing standard of care for malpractice cases:
In any action for damages for personal injury or death arising out
of the furnishing or the failure to furnish medical, dental, or other
health care, the defendant shall not be liable for the payment of
damages unless the trier of the facts is satisfied by the greater
weight of the evidence that the care of such health care provider was
not in accordance with the practices and procedures for services
which were provided in the same or similar communities by similar
health care providers at the time of the alleged act giving rise to the
cause of action.39
While the practical difference between the proposed standard and the
North Carolina common law standard may be slight, there is a crucial
theoretical difference between them. As noted above, the common law
standard essentially requires that a physician have the skill of other
similarly situated physicians and that he exercise reasonable care under
the circumstances.40 Under that standard the courts normally rely
upon expert testimony describing the accepted practices and procedures
in similar communities. 41  The courts retain the power, however, to
determine that the usual practices of the profession fail to meet the
standard of reasonable care and to hold defendant liable notwithstand-
ing the fact that his actions were in accord with standard procedure.
Under the proposed legislation, however, a physician who acts in ac-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. STUDY REPORT, supra note 2, Appendix VI, at 3.
40. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
41. See, e.g., Dickens v. Everhart, 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973); Wiggins
v. Piver, 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).
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cordance with standard procedure in the same or a similar community
seems to have an absolute defense.
The intent of a "same or similar communities" provision must be to
prevent extreme results such as occured in the Helling case. 2 But the
Legislature must also consider the dangers inherent in according conclu-
sive weight to the standard practice of the medical profession, 4 especial-
ly considering the paucity of North Carolina cases as questionable as
Helling. More typical of North Carolina law is the rule that, notwith-
standing standard practice, a physician has a duty to disclose any
abnormal risks in treatment once a doctor-patient relationship is estab-
lished.44 Perhaps the best illustrations of the need for a jury to be able
to find that a practice generally followed by the medical profession is
negligent are the "sponge cases." Many juries have found physicians
negligent when sponges have been left in patients after operations,
notwithstanding that the task of keeping track of the sponges had been
delegated in many of these cases to a nurse. Prosser notes that
"[a]lthough this was, and perhaps still is universal practice, it has still
been found to be negligent."45  Such a result seems reasonable. One
would expect to find few cases in which standard procedures could fairly
be held negligent, but to prohibit the court from so holding may
diminish the deterrent effect of negligence law and may result in ex-
treme unfairness in particular cases, particularly if the courts apply a
strict locality rule.
40
B. The Locality Rule
The purpose of the locality rule is to insure that a physician in one
geographical area is not judged by the standards of the profession in
another area. It would be unfair to require a rural physician to possess
the skills and training of his colleagues in urban centers who perhaps
have greater access to technological innovations or greater opportunities
42. See text accompanying notes 20-21 supra.
43. See note 21 supra.
44. See, e.g., Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964).
45. W. PROSSER, THE LAw oF TORTS 165 (4th ed. 1971) (footnote omitted). See,
e.g., Leonard v. Watsonville Community. Hosp., 47 Cal. 2d 509, 305 P.2d 36 (1957);
Ault v. Hall, 119 Ohio St. 422, 164 N.E. 518 (1928). For North Carolina sponge cases,
see, e.g., Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941).
46. The locality rule is discussed in the text accompanying notes 47-64 infra.
Koury v. Folio, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968), discussed in connection with the
locality rule, provides a particularly good example of a case in which application of a
strict locality rule combined with a decision to accord conclusive weight to standard
practice would have resulted in a grossly unfair result,
1976] 1223
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for continuing education. There are now four versions of the locality
rule in effect in various jurisdictions: 47 (a) a strict locality rule, requir-
ing that a physician's conduct be judged according to the standards of
his particular community; (2) a rule employing a more expansive
conception of the geographical area encompassed by the physician's
"locality"; (3) a rule extending the area of comparison to any similar
locality; (4) a rule that considers the standards of the physician's
locality as merely one factor in determining whether "reasonable care
under the circumstances" was exercised.
The North Carolina Supreme Court discussed the origin of and
reasons for the locality rule in the landmark case of Wiggins v. Piver"8
which rejected the strict locality rule for the state. The court said that
the rule had its "origin in the very old and far away days when there
were many little institutions which called themselves medical schools."40
At that time, any student with a high school diploma or its equivalent
was admitted to medical school. A degree was awarded upon complet-
ing the course, and "[p]assing the licensing board was in the nature of a
formality."50 In rural areas the physician was on his own; "[firequent
refresher courses, now generally attended, were unknown."' Today,
on the other hand, only outstanding college graduates are admitted to
medical schools and medical education includes internships and actual
experience under expert supervision. Physicians now attend refresher
courses and have access to journals that enable them to keep current in
the latest treatment and procedures.52  In short, the North Carolina
Supreme Court concluded that the reasons for the strict locality rule no
longer exist.5
3
In Wiggins an expert witness testified that sutures in plaintiffs leg
"were insufficient properly to close the two incisions in the leg."" This
expert was not familiar with the actual practice in the town in which the
injury occurred, but he was familiar with the practice in similar com-
munities elsewhere in the state. The court admitted this expert testimo-
ny because "[rieason does not appear to the non-medically oriented
47. Note, Medical Specialties and the Locality Rule, 14 STAN. L. PREV. 884 (1962).
48. 276 N.C. 134, 171 S.E.2d 393 (1970).




53. See generally Note, Medical Malpractice: Rejection of the "Locality Rule,"
46 N.C.L REv. 630 (1968).
54. 276 N.C. at 137, 171 S.E.2d at 395.
[Vol. 541224
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
mind why there should be any essential difference in the manner of
closing an incision, whether performed in Jacksonville, Kinston, Golds-
boro, Sanford, Lexington, Reidsville, Elkin, Mount Airy or any other
similar community in North Carolina."5
While the Wiggins court relied upon the "similarly situated" lan-
guage of the common law standard of care, language that could be
interpreted to require any of the four versions of the locality rule, the
case itself seems to be limited to an extension of the geographical area
that will be considered within the physician's locality. In Dickens v.
Everhart,56 however, the North Carolina Supreme Court clearly dis-
pelled any lingering doubts that it would accept expert testimony from
any similar community. In that case an expert who had been practicing
in either Ohio or California at the time the injury occurred in Mount
Airy in 1964 was not allowed to testify because he was not familiar with
standard medical practice in the Mount Airy area in 1964. The North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the expert's famil-
iarity with similar communities in other states was sufficient to qualify
him to testify.
The only other major North Carolina case on this point is Ricker v.
High Point Memorial Hospital.57 In that case an expert was not famil-
iar with the particular hospital in which plaintiff was treated for a
gunshot wound of the lower leg, but he was familiar with the practices
and procedures in other duly accredited hospitals and he testified that
such procedures were "essentially the same throughout the United
States."' 58 Furthermore, the court found that gunshot wounds of the
lower leg "lend themselves most readily to uniform medical and surgical
treatment without regard to locality."59  While not all injuries are
subject to such generally well known and uniform modes of treatment,60
the court held that in cases in which treatment is uniform the relevant
locality is the entire United States. Although the Wiggins and Dickens
decisions were explicitly reaffirmed, the North Carolina Supreme Court
made clear that in certain special situations, such as when treatment
takes place in a fully accredited hospital, the entire United States can
55. Id. at 138, 171 S.E.2d at 395-96.
56. 284 N.C. 95, 199 S.E.2d 440 (1973).
57. 285 N.C. 519, 206 S.E.2d 196 (1974).
58. Id. at 526, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
59. Id. at 527, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
60. The court used as examples snake bites in Florida and frost bite in Alaska.
Id. at 527-28, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
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count as a "similar locality."'61
A 1968 North Carolina case, Koury v. Folio,12 exemplifies the
danger of unfairness inherent in the strict locality rule. In that case, a
Greensboro physician prescribed injections of a drug containing strepto-
mycin for plaintiff's nine month old baby to treat a cold and bronchitis.
As a result, the child became deaf. A label on the drug container
stated, "Not for Pediatric Use," and the container was accompanied by a
warning. Plaintiffs expert testified that the drug was a known hazard
when used to treat children. Defendant testified that other pediatricians
in Greensboro were using the drug for children as young as plaintiffs
child. It is not clear from the opinion whether plaintiff's expert was
from Greensboro, but the court apparently found that the physician's
behavior was unreasonable even if it were in accord with customary
practice in that city. This case illustrates the dangers both of a strict
locality rule and of according conclusive weight to standard practice (we
probably would not approve of this conduct even if it were customary
everywhere, but certainly not if it were customary in Greensboro but not
elsewhere).
The North Carolina rule seems to be the 'best one because of the
dangers exemplified in the Koury case and because of the standardiza-
tion of medical practice in recent years. This standardization eliminates
the unfairness of allowing non-local experts to testify, especially since
those experts must be familiar with similar communities. An additional
reason to prefer the "similar locality" standard is that the strict locality
rule exacerbates the problem of finding expert testimony. It is well
known that plaintiffs often have difficulty finding expert witnesses even
in cases of clear negligence, and this problem is greatly aggravated when
plaintiff must find a physician who is willing to testify against a col-
league from his community.6 3
The North Carolina Study Commission's proposed standard of care
seems to retain the state's current locality rule by requiring a physician
to conform to the practice and procedures "in the same or similar
communities." 64  It is a standard that seems fair to both sides and
reasonable.
61. Id. at 527, 206 S.E.2d at 201.
62. 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
63. See, e.g., Seidelson, Medical Malpractice Cases and the Reluctant Expert, 16
CATH. U.L. REv. 158 (1966). Our survey of North Carolina lawyers suggests that this
problem is still a major one in spite of the rejection of the strict locality rule. See Part
II infra.
64. SfMY RoRT, supra note 2, Appendix VI, at 3.
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C. Statutes of Limitations
Limitations upon the time within which a cause of action must be
brought are entirely a matter of state statutory law; statutes of limita-
tions have no counterparts at common law.65 The policy reasons for the
adoption of such statutes are concerned primarily with the protection of
defendant from prosecution of stale and possibly fraudulent claims at a
time when memories have faded, evidence has been lost and witnesses
have disappeared. 6 In these statutes, legislatures attempt to balance
such concerns against the policy of insuring plaintiff access to the courts
to recover for injuries caused by another person's negligence.
67
The current crisis in medical malpractice insurance has created
special concern about statutes of limitations in malpractice cases. A
shorter statutory period would not only tend to reduce the total number
of claims ultimately brought, but would also mitigate the "long tail"
problem, which affects insurance company reserves and actuarial calcu-
lations.6 8 This "long tail" problem is caused by the extended period of
time within which malpractice suits may be instituted and the typically
long additional period between the commencement of a suit and its
settlement. Insurance companies find setting rates extremely difficult
because actions arising out of medical services provided in one year may
not result in malpractice suits until many years later. This problem is
complicated by the fact that in many states, including North Carolina,69
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the patient's injury
is, or reasonably should have been, discovered. Furthermore, many
states, again including North Carolina, t° provide that the statute does
not begin to run against an insane person or a minor until his disability
is removed. 71  Consequently, an insurance company that provides cov-
65. For an excellent discussion of this topic, see Developments in the Law-Stat-
utes of Limitations, 63 HAnv. L. REv. 1177 (1950).
66. Id. at 1185.
67. As part of this balancing process, legislatures often create special exceptions
for disabled groups such as the insane and minors. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-17
(1971).
68. See generally NEw YoRK REPORT, supra note 8, at 35-37, 175-78.
69. See N.C. GEN. STAT. -§ 1-15(b) (Supp. 1975). This statute does require that
a suit must be brought within ten years of the last act of defendant giving rise to the
claim for relief regardless of when the injury is or should have been discovered.
70. Id. § 1-17.
71. A recent widely publicized New York case illustrates just how long this provi-
sion can toll the statute of limitations. Gail Kalmowitz was born prematurely in 1953
and treated with highly concentrated oxygen. This treatment resulted in incurable blind-
ness. Nineteen years later, in 1972, the Kalmowitz family sued Brookdale Hospital and
the attending physicians; Kalmowitz's cause of action survived because of an infancy
122719"761
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
erage for medical services in a particular year must be prepared to
respond to claims arising out of those services for many later years;
hence the reserve and actuarial problems.72
As a result of a 1971 amendment to section 1-15 of the General
Statutes, North Carolina's law on the statute of limitations is now clearly
and precisely defined."3 It has long been clear that an action for
medical malpractice must be brought within three years after it ac-
crued.74  Section 1-15(b) now makes it clear that a cause of action
accrues, and hence the statute begins to run, in cases in which the injury
was not immediately apparent to plaintiff when the injury is discovered
or reasonably ought to have been discovered by him .7  The statute does
require, however, that all actions be commenced within ten years of the
last act of defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.71 Consequently,
medical services rendered in North Carolina to persons not under a
disability can result in actions up to ten years later. And, of course,
suits brought at that time might consume several more years before
reaching settlement. Moreover, North Carolina law provides that one
who is a minor or insane at the time a cause of action accrues may bring
an action within the time otherwise allowed after his disability is re-
moved. 77  Clearly, therefore, North Carolina law does create a "long
tail" problem for insurance companies, especially in cases involving
persons under disability and in situations in which the consequences of
malpractice are not apparent soon after treatment.
The Study Commission has proposed changes in North Carolina's
statute of limitations that are designed to mitigate these problems. First,
the Commission would amend section 1-15(b) to except from its "dis-
covery of injury" provisions actions "arising out of the performance of
or failure to perform professional services." 78 Secondly, the Commis-
provision in the statute of limitations. In April, 1975, Ms. Kalmowitz settled for
$165,000 just a few minutes before a jury would have awarded $900,000. NnwswmNK,
June 9, 1975, at 65.
72. For a discussion of attempts to deal with this problem by conversion to a
"claims filed" insurance system, see Part I infra.
73. The 1971 amendment to N.C. GrN. STAT. § 1-15 adopted the discovery rule.
This amendment is discussed in Note, 7 WAKE FoR.sr L. Rav. 688 (1971). A general
discussion of when a cause of action accrues in medical malpractice cases appears in
Note, 6 WAKE FOREST L. Rv. 532 (1970).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-15, 46, -52(5) (1971).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (Supp. 1975).
76. Id.
77. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 1-17 (1971).
78. STUDY REPORT, supra note 2, Appendix VI, at 1. This exception would not
apply to legal malpractice since bodily injury or property damage must be an essential
element of the claim.
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sion would add to section 1-15 a subsection (c) providing that in cases
arising out of professional malpractice in which the injury was not
readily apparent to the claimant at the time of its origin,79 suit must be
commenced within three years of the act giving rise to the cause of
action if the injury is or should reasonably have been discovered within
two years after the occurrence of that act. Subsection (c) further
provides that when the injury is or reasonably should have been discov-
ered more than two but less than three years after the acte' giving rise to
the cause of action, the suit must be commenced within one year after
the discovery was or reasonably should have been made.' The pro-
posed subsection also provides that no action shall be commenced more
than four years from the date of the last act giving rise to the cause of
action.8 2  In short, the Commission would shorten from ten to four
years the maximum period after treatment within which a physician and
his insurance company might face a malpractice action by a non-
disabled adult arising out of that treatment.
The Commission also proposes modification of the North Carolina
rule for minors. It would amend section 1-17 by adding a subsection
(b) which would make proposed subsection 1-15(c) applicable to
actions on behalf of a minor "whether in tort or contract, having as an
essential element bodily injury to the person."'83 However, an exception
is created for minors under the age of seven, for whom an action would
have to be commenced with the period prescribed by section 1-15(c) as
if the cause of action accrued at the time the minor reached the age of
seven.8
4
Despite the likelihood that these proposed changes would ease the
problems occasioned by liberal statutes of limitations, their wisdom is
questionable. Before section 1-15(b) was enacted, the North Carolina
courts refused to abandon the common law rule that -the statute of
limitations "begins to run whenever a right of the aggrieved party is
violated.' 85 This rule created unfairness and hardship in many cases in
79. In all other cases arising out of professional malpractice the cause of action
accrues at the time of the occurrence of the act giving rise to the cause of action. STUDy
REPORT, supra note 2, Appendix VI, at 1-2.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Note, 7 WAKE FoR.sT L RaV. 688'-89 (1971). See, e.g., Sloan v. Hart, 150
N.C. 269, 63 S.E. 1037 (1909); Lewis v. Godwin Oil Co., 1 N.C. App. 570, 162 S.E.2d
135 (1968).
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which the injury caused by defendant's negligence did not become
apparent until after the statute had run. In the medical malpractice
field, this unfairness was most clear in the "sponge cases." In Shearin
v. Lloyd, 8 for example, the court held that an action based upon a
physician's negligence in leaving a foreign object in the patient's body
accrued immediately upon the closing of the incision and, consequently,
could not be maintained more than three years later even though the
damage was not discoverable until long after the operation. The Com-
mission's proposals would reopen this door to unfairness that the Legis-
lature closed when it enacted section 1-15(b). Such action should not
be taken in the absence of a very clear showing that it would significant-
ly diminish the "long tail" problem. While we lack the resources
necessary to have undertaken a study of this precise question for North
Carolina, the New York malpractice study concluded that a further
reduction of its statute of limitations "is not likely to result in greater
insurance availability or in decreased premium cost."8 7 The New York
statute now provides for a basic two and one-half year limit, modified by
a limit of one year after the date a foreign object is or should have been
discovered if that date is more than two and one-half years after the act
giving rise to the cause of action, and a limit of ten years on the time
within which a malpractice action may be commenced on behalf of an
infant.88 While some states have adopted outside limits for the com-
mencement of actions of as little as three, four or seven years,89 the New
York conclusion that such short limits are "unreasonable and may
deprive some claimants of their proper right to compensation"8 0 seems
in accord with the equities of the situation absent a very clear showing of
direct and substantial practical benefits from so short a statutory period.
Without such a showing, the current absolute limit in North Carolina of
ten years, adopted just five years ago in response to cases such as
Shearin, should not be shortened.
D. Res Ipsa Loquitur
There are many misconceptions and much confusion surrounding
86. 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d 508 (1957).
87. NBw Yox REIPoRT, supra note 8, at 36 (emphasis omitted).
88. Id.
89. Law of May 20, 1975, ch. 75-9, § 7, [1975] Fla. Laws 13, amending FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 95.11; Act of Oct. 15, 1975, No. 111, § 605, [1975] Pa. Legis. Serv. 296, to be
codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1301.605; TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3415(a) (Supp.
1975). See NEw YoRx REPORT, supra note 8, Appendix VI, at 1-2.
90. NEw Yoax REPORT, supra note 8, at 178.
1230 [Vol. 54
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself), especially
as it is applied in medical malpractice cases. Much of this confusion
results from a failure to understand and distinguish properly the con-
cepts of "prima facie case" and "burden of proof." In all cases,
including medical malpractice cases, the burden of proof of every allega-
tion necessary to constitute a cause of action is on plaintiff: plaintiff
must prove to the jury that it is more likely than not that all of the
allegations essential to his cause of action are true. This burden of
proof never shifts to defendant. A prima facie case is one legally
sufficient to go to the jury. In a res ipsa loquitur case, the mere fact
that the injury occurred as it did is sufficient to raise an inference that
defendant was negligent. When plaintiff makes out such a prima facie
case, defendant must introduce evidence to explain away the circum-
stantial evidence that gave rise to it.9" If defendant fails to do so, he
risks the chance that the jury will return a verdict for plaintiff on the
basis of that circumstantial evidence.
Part of the explanation for the confusion and concern about the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur probably results from the fact that in some
jurisdictions it has been stretched to reach questionable results,
92 most
notably in California.93 In North Carolina, however, res ipsa loquitur
has been properly defined and seemingly well applied by the courts. In
Etheridge v. Etheridge94 the North Carolina Supreme Court defined the
doctrine as follows:
When a thing which caused an injury is shown to be under the
control and operation of the party charged with negligence and the
accident is one which, in the ordinary course of things, will not hap-
pen if those who have such control and operation use proper care,
the accident itself, in the absence of an explanation by the party
charged, affords some evidence that it arose from want of proper
care.95
As the Legislative Commission noted, the North Carolina courts
have not generally applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in malprac-
tice cases "unless the facts surrounding the injury leave no room for any
other conclusion but that there was negligence."9" The North Carolina
91. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 45, §§ 39, 40; SECRETARY'S REPORT,
supra note 11, at 28-29.
92. NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 8, at 173.
93. Id. See Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical Malpractice Laws
-Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN . L. REv. 251 (1962).
94. 222 N.C. 616, 24 S.E.2d 477 (1943).
95. id. at 619, 24 S.E.2d at 479.
96. STUDY REPORT, supra note 2, at 26.
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Supreme Court has emphasized many times that no presumption of
negligence can arise "from the mere result of a treatment upon the
theory that it was not satisfactory or less than could be desired, or
different from what might be expected. '9 7 The one situation in which
the North Carolina Court has often applied res ipsa loquitur is when
foreign bodies have been left in the patient's body during a surgical
operation. 98  In such cases defendant's negligence is manifest from the
mere occurrence of the injury, and so application of the doctrine is
proper.
In other kinds of cases, exemplified by Boyd v. Kistler,"9 North
Carolina courts have been hesitant to apply res ipsa. In Boyd, defend-
ant removed plaintiff's teeth while plaintiff was under anesthetic be-
tween 7:30 A.M. and 10:30 A.M. At 3:00 P.M. a red mark began to
form on plaintiffs lip. The prop that had been used to keep plaintiff's
mouth open while she was unconscious had an arm that appeared to fit
the scar. Nonetheless, the court refused to allow the case to go to the
jury because no evidence tending to show that the prop was defective or
that it had not been properly used in this case was introduced. Noting
that "[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be relied on to supply
deficiencies in the proof," 00 the court concluded that the mere fact of
injury could not support an inference of negligence. The result might
have been different if plaintiff had introduced expert testimony that
such an injury would not occur absent negligence, but the court was not
willing to allow the jury to draw that inference merely from the circum-
stances of the injury. The degree of hostility to a liberal application of
the res ipsa doctrine reflected in this decision seems especially strong
when one considers that plaintiff was unconscious at the time of her
injury; many courts have been willing to apply the doctrine in such
cases.' The attitude of the Boyd court to the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is typical of courts in North Carolina.0 2
Since the North Carolina courts have generally not misused the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Study Commission's conclusion that no
statutory enactment on the subject is necessary seems correct. But, it is
97. Mitchell v. Saunders, 219 N.C. 178-79, 13 S.E.2d 242, 245 (1941).
98. See id.
99. 270 N.C. 744, 155 S.E.2d 208 (1967).
100. Id. at 747, 155 S.E.2d at 210.
101. E.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
102. E.g., Koury v. Folio, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968); Starnes v. Taylor,




important to observe that the Commission's proposed statutory defini-
tion of the standard of care in malpractice cases may affect the applica-
tion of the doctrine. As noted above, the Commission's proposed
definition of malpractice seems to preclude a finding of negligence
absent a showing that the care provided was not in accordance with
standard practices and procedures; action that is in accord with standard
practice and procedure would seemingly constitute an absolute defense
to any malpractice claim, even in the "sponge cases." I[f the courts
conclude that a foreign object left in the patient's body is insufficient to
support an inference that the care of the physician was not in accord-
ance with standard practice and procedure, 103 then they may refuse to
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. This possibility provides further
support for the conclusion that the standard practices and procedures of
the medical profession should not be considered determinative.
E. The Collateral Source Rule
One of the most familiar common law doctrines states that, in
determining the amount of damages to award a plaintiff, a jury cannot
consider the fact that he may have received payments from other
sources, such as insurance or disability compensation. 04 The purpose
of the collateral source rule, which has been applied since the late
nineteenth century,' was to strengthen the role of the tort system in
deterring negligent conduct and to prevent tortfeasors from benefiting
from the prudence of their insured victims.'
These policy justifications, as the New York Report argues,'0 7 no
longer provide sufficient justification for the rule, for several reasons.
First, there are now many forms of public compensation available to
plaintiffs. Many victims are compensated by Medicare, Social Security,
Workmen's Compensation, Blue Cross-Blue Shield and other health
plans that "are largely public in nature or form part of employment or
union benefit programs and thus are no longer 'prudent' acts of individ-
103. Under current law the fact that a foreign object was left in the patient's body
can support an inference of negligence whether or not the physician followed standard
practice and procedure. W. PROSSER, supra note 45, at 165.
104. See generally Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of
Damages, 46 MNN. L. REV. 669 (1962).
105. The first case to apply the rule was The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58
U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854), and the first case to use the term "collateral source" was
Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1870). Maxwell, The Collateral Source
Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. RaV. 669, 671 & nn.6, 7 (1962).
106. Nnw YoRK REPORT, supra note 8, at 183.
107. Id. at 39, 183.
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uals."' 08  Second, the defendant physician in malpractice suits is al-
most always insured, and so does not pay the damage award from his
own pocket. The result of the rule is that the victim is compensated
twice, and the public must pay twice, for a single loss. 00 Abolition of
the collateral source rule could have a significant impact on insurance
costs; the American Insurance Association has estimated that a dollar-
for-dollar reduction in damages for recovery from collateral sources
could reduce premiums by ten to fifteen percent. 10
The Study Commission proposes that North Carolina adopt a
statute reducing damage awards in all personal injury actions"' by the
amount of all collateral recoveries "for medical and hospital care, custo-
dial care or rehabilitative services, and loss of earnings or other econom-
ic loss" except for insurance benefits for which the cost of the policy was
paid "either by or for the person or on behalf of a dependent who has
obtained the award.""' 2 The justification for this proposal must be that
only when the victim pays for the insurance himself can one fairly
conclude that the collateral recovery results from his own prudence.
Still, it seems unwise to make an exception for benefits received under
policies paid for by the victim. Certainly total abolition of the collateral
source rule would have a greater impact on insurance costs than the
Study Commission's proposal. Furthermore, abolition of the collateral
source rule, unlike some of the other proposed changes in tort law, will
work no unfairness on the patient-plaintiff; the victim will still receive
full compensation for his injury. Safeguards could be built into a
statute totally abolishing the collateral source rule to protect the prudent
patient. For example, such a statute could provide that a plaintiff
108. Id. at 183.
109. Most commentators agree that the collateral source rule should be abolished.
E.g., Averbach, The Collateral Source Rule, 21 Omo ST. L.J. 231 (1960); Fleming, The
Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1478 (1966);
Note, 77 IH-nv. L. REv. 741 (1964).
110. NEW YoRK REPORT, supra note 8, at 183.
111. Note that this change is not limited to medical malpractice cases; see note 112
infra.
112. The text of the proposed statute is:
In any action for malpractice arising out of the performance or failure to per-
forn professional services where the plaintiff seeks to recover for the cost of
medical care, custodial care or rehabilitation services, loss of earnings or other
economic loss, an award of damages shall not be reduced by insurance pro-
ceeds or payments of other benefits paid under any insurance policy or contract
where the premium or cost of such insurance policy or contract was paid
either by or for the person or on behalf of a dependent who has obtained the
award, but shall be reduced by any other collateral recovery for medical and
hospital care, custodial care or rehabilitation services, loss of earnings or other
economic loss.
STuDY REP oRT, supra note 2, Appendix VI, at 5-6.
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should receive compensation for any increase in his insurance costs
caused by the injury and might even require the tortfeasor to pay part or
all of the victim's premiums." 3 On balance, therefore, the Study
Commission's proposal constitutes an improvement in the present state
of the law, but total abolition of the collateral source rule seems prefera-
ble.
F. Informed Consent
A malpractice action based on lack of informed consent rests upon
a battery rather than a negligence theory. The basis of the claim is that
the physician did not disclose to the patient the nature and extent of the
risks involved in his treatment; the patient's consent to that treatment
was therefore not informed and so not a consent at all. 114 Under this
theory, the physician is liable for the damages caused by his unlawful
violation of the patient's bodily integrity.
While the underlying theory of informed consent actions is quite
clear, there has been a divergence of views among the states concerning
the proper application of that theory. 1 5 Here, as in much of malprac-
tice law, California seems to have the most extreme rules. In Califor-
nia, "[a] physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself
to liability if he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the
basis of an intelligent consent.""' 6 The majority rule, however, is that
the physician's duty to disclose risks depends "on whether it was the
custom of physicians practicing in the community to make the particular
disclosure to the patient. . . . [Tihere can be no recovery unless the
omission forsakes a practice prevalent in the profession."'1 7
113. Of course the tortfeasor should be liable for no more in insurance premiums
than the amount of damage that he caused. The New York Report also suggests that
there should be no legal right of subrogation to prevent dissipation of the savings gener-
ated by elimination of duplication of recovery, and that attorneys' fees should be based
on the full amount of the verdict before reduction for payment from collateral sources.
NEw YoiR REPoRT, supra note 8, at 184-85.
114. For discussions of this whole area of the law, see SHAnTsIs, Informed Consent:
Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. RFv. 527 (1972); Note, Informed Consent-A
Proposed Standard for Medical Disclosure, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 548 (1973); Note, Duty
of Doctor to Inform Patient of Risks of Treatment: Battery or Negligence?, 34 So.
CAL. L. REV. 217 (1961).
115. A discussion of all of the wide variety of possible rules lies beyond the scope
of this paper. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1973).
116. Salgo v. Stanford Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1st Dist. 1957).
117. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (footnotes omit-
ted). Canterbury adopted the minority rule. Id. See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d
1084, 1095-96 (1973). For a discussion of some other approaches, see id. at 1091-99.
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North Carolina's courts have adopted a conservative approach to
the application of the theory of informed consent." 8  In Starnes v.
Taylor," 9 the court refused to define precisely the extent of the physi-
cian's duty to inform his patient of risks involved in his treatment, but
emphasized that "much must be left to the discretion of the physician or
surgeon in determining what he should tell the patient as to possible
adverse consequences.' ' 0  The court emphasized in Starnes that a
patient's anxiety about a risk may endanger the success of his treatment
and that a physician should be concerned primarily with "the treatment
of the patient's illness or disability, not preparation for the defense of a
possible lawsuit."'' Furthermore, the court is quite clearly aware of
the problem of causation in informed consent actions when it says,
"there is nothing to indicate that the most complete discussion of the
risk attendant upon this procedure would have deterred the plaintiff
from consenting to. its performance.' 2 2 If the injured plaintiff would
have consented to the proposed treatment even if he had been informed
of all the risks, then the physician's failure to inform him of those risks
is in no way responsible for the patient's injuries.
From its discussion in Starnes it seems clear that the North Caroli-
na Supreme Court, while it declined to define precisely the extent of the
physician's duty to inform, would not be inclined to find liability in the
absence of fraud, misrepresentation or a failure to conform to the
standards of the profession (the majority rule discussed above). In
Butler v. Berkeley,'23 the North Carolina Court of Appeals, after a
careful discussion of the North Carolina cases, expressly adopted the
majority rule because it is "much more practical . . . in application and
result."'12 4 The Court of Appeals said that:
To adopt the minority rule of Canterbury would result in
requiring every doctor to spend much unnecessary time in going
over with every patient every possible effect of any proposed treat-
ment. The doctor should not have to practice his profession with
the knowledge that every consultation with every patient with re-
spect to future treatment contains a potential lawsuit and his advice
118. See, e.g., Starnes v. Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968); Watson v.
Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964); Butler v. Berkeley, 25 N.C. App. 325,
213 S.E.2d 571 (1975).
119. 272 N.C. 386, 158 S.E.2d 339 (1968).
120. Id. at 393, 158 S.E.2d at 344.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 25 N.C. App. 325, 213 S.E.2d 571 (1975).
124. Id. at 342, 213 S.E.2d at 582.
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and suggestions must necessarily be phrased with the possible de-
fense of a lawsuit in mind. This would necessarily result in the
doctor's inability to give the best interest of his patient primary
importance.125
In sum, it seems fair to conclude that North Carolina's courts have
emphasized the physician's discretion with regard to what is best for his
patient rather than the patient's right to know all of the possible risks
involved in his treatment.
The Study Commission proposes that the North Carolina Legisla-
ture adopt a statute defining the law of informed consent with specifici-
ty. Since physicians need this kind of specific knowledge to frame their
conduct, the Commission's recommendation that this area of the law be
codified is a good one.126  Section (a)(1) of the proposed informed
consent statute would preclude recovery in cases in which the physician's
conduct was in accord with the standards of practice "of the same health
care profession with similar training and experience situated in the same
or similar community.' 1 27  This basic result, which is essentially the
majority rule discussed above, seems justified in light of the physician's
need to consider the possible adverse impact of knowledge of risks on a
patient's response to treatment. The statute may go too far, however, in
according conclusive weight to the standard practice of the profession.
Certainly conformity with standard practice should suffice in most cases,
but the court should retain the power to condemn the standards of the
profession in extraordinary circumstances for all of the reasons discussed
in connection with the physician's standard of care. Vesting such
discretion in the courts seems especially appropriate in a state such as
North Carolina, where the courts have proceeded with care, caution and
ample respect for the training and specialized knowledge of physicians.
Section (a)(2) of the proposed statute would preclude recovery in
informed consent actions if, from the information provided by the
physician, a reasonable person would have had "a general understand-
ing of the procedures or treatments and of the usual and most frequent
risks and hazards inherent in the proposed procedures or treatments."' 28
Such an enactment seems justified, as it clarifies the duty of the physi-
cian; he need not fear liability simply because a particular patient did
125. Id. at 342, 213 S.E.2d at 581-82.
126. Such a codification would also, of course, serve to prevent the courts from
changing and developing the law of informed consent.
127. STUDY REPoRT, supra note 2, Appendix Vi, at 4.
128. Id.
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not understand the risks involved in the proposed treatment so long as
he provided enough information for a reasonable person to have had
sufficient understanding of those risks. Such a rule provides security
for physicians without unfairness to patients.
Section (a)(3) of the proposed statute precludes recovery if a
reasonable person would have undergone treatment if he had been
properly advised of the risks of that treatment.120 Clearly the point of
this proposal is to prevent recovery when the physician's failure to
disclose did not cause the patient's injuries. While a true test of
causation would be whether this patient would have undergone the
treatment if he had been advised of the risks, the objective "reasonable
person" standard is more appropriate because of the extreme difficulty
of deciding after the injury whether a particular patient would have
consented to treatment.
There are strong arguments for and against this proposal. It does
seem unfair to hold a doctor liable for damages because of a failure to
disclose when those same damages would have occurred in any event.
On the other hand, if we do not hold the physician liable in such cases
we greatly diminish the incentive for him to meet fully his obligation to
obtain an informed consent. An ostensibly fair compromise would be
to provide a penalty for physicians when they fail to obtain the informed
consent of their patients. Such a compromise could provide for a fixed
penalty for all failures to obtain an informed consent, or for a limited
number of such penalties appropriately scaled to the gravity of the
physician's failure. Fixed penalties in lieu of damage awards are essen-
tial to prevent sympathetic injuries from inflating awards to compensate
injured patients. While in theory such relief should be available to all
patients whose informed consent was never obtained, the action should
be limited to cases in which actual injury results, in order to prevent a
multiplicity of frivolous claims against physicians. Such a compromise
might serve to eliminate the unfairness to physicians of requiring them
to pay for damages they did not cause, while still retaining a deterrent
effect to prevent physicians from ignoring their duty to obtain an
informed consent. To insulate a physician from all liability when he
has violated the loose standards of the Commission's proposed informed
consent statute seems unfair.
Section (b) of the proposed legislation provides that a consent in




patient or other authorized person, shall be presumed to be a valid
consent."' 30 This presumption could be rebutted only upon proof that
"such signature and consent was obtained by fraud, deception or misre-
presentation of a material fact."' 3 The purpose of this proposal is
apparently to provide physicians with an essentially guaranteed means of
meeting their duty to obtain the patient's informed consent. There is,
however, considerable danger involved in adopting this approach. It is
common experience that many people sign long standard forms without
reading them. Such a tendency may be especially strong when the
reader is ill and the signing of the document seems to be a condition of
treatment. Fraud, deception and misrepresentation will be extremely
difficult for patients to prove in court. Given the fact that the North
Carolina courts have exercised considerable restraint in the informed
consent area, proposed subsection (b) seems to go too far in counteract-
ing the policy of the state that all patients be entitled to make an
informed consent prior to treatment.
G. Contract to Cure
A very rarely used theory of recovery in malpractice cases is based
upon the law of contract: a physician "guaranteed" to bring about a
certain result and failed to do so.' 3 2  In subsection (d) of its informed
consent statute, 3  the Study Commission proposes that no recoveries be
allowed on this theory unless the contractual promise is in writing.
Despite the New York Malpractice Paners conclusion that the small
number of cases based on this theory has no impact on insurance
availability and that "there is no reason why a physician should not live
up to a contractual obligation if it is proved that he undertook it,"' 34 the
Study Commission's proposal seems wise. Contracts to cure are very
rare and, given the uncertain nature of medical science, are rarely
appropriate. There seem to be no policy reasons for favoring actions
based on this theory, and the likelihood of fraudulent claims is high.
Summary
This analysis of the law of medical malpractice and the modifica-
130. Id.
131. Id. at 5.
132. SECRETARY'S REPORT, supra note 11, at 30.
133. STUDY REPORT, supra note 2, Appendix VI, at 5. Contracts to cure and in-
formed consent are dealt with in the same statute presumably because they constitute
alternatives to the usual negligence theory of recovery.
134. NEw YoRK REPORT, supra note 8, at 181,
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tions proposed by the North Carolina Study Commission is based upon
the assumption that modifications of the tort law designed to eliminate
current biases against the physician-defendant are justifiable. If the
present negligence-based system cannot handle this problem without
unfairly "stacking the deck" against the patient-plaintiff, then an alter-
native system should be adopted. In most areas of malpractice law
North Carolina has adopted a relatively conservative approach and has
avoided abuses that have appeared in some jurisdictions. Still, the
medical malpractice law of North Carolina can be improved, and most
of the modifications proposed by the Study Commission would serve
that function. Judged by the standard of fairness, however, the Com-
mission's proposals to accord conclusive weight in defining malpractice
to standard medical procedures and to shorten the relevant statutes of
limitations are found lacking. Furthermore, certain aspects of the
proposed statute on informed consent threaten to work unfairness and
should be carefully examined by the Legislature. On the other hand,
the Commission's proposal concerning the collateral source rule does not
go far enough. Total elimination of the collateral source rule would
contribute significantly to reducing the crushing costs of malpractice
without unfairly disadvantaging plaintiffs.
II. METHODS OF REDUCING THE SIZE OF AWARDS
A. Direct Limitations
Substantively limiting the grounds for recovery is one avenue to
reducing the severity of malpraotice awards and the concomitant rise in
liability insurance premiums. Direct and indirect limits on the size of
awards are alternative paths to this result. A direct limit is a ceiling on
the amount that may be collected by a plaintiff for all of his injuries or,
less drastically, for his intangible injuries, chiefly pain and suffering.
Indirect limitation of the size of malpractice awards may be accom-
plished by revision of the collateral source rule, restrictions on the
contingent fee system of attorney compensation, and methods for allow-
ing periodic payment of sums awarded for future medical expenses.
Several states have adopted absolute or proportional limits on the
amount of damages a successful plaintiff may collect from a negligent
doctor.'3 5 In only one state has a challenge to this limitation even
135. E.g., TDHo CoDE § 39-4204 (Bums Supp. 1975) ($150,000); IND. Ai. STAT.




reached a lower court, and, in Jones v. State Board of Health,' an
Idaho District Court reportedly held that state's limit of $150,000 per
incident to be a violation of a state constitutional provision"' guarantee-
ing that the courts shall be open to every person seeking redress for
every type of legal injury.1 8 North Carolina has a similar clause in its
constitution,139 and any law limiting liability could well face a challenge
under that provision.
Similar "open court" provisions recently have been interpreted by a
number of state courts in the context of no fault automobile insurance.
These cases provide useful analogies for deciding the constitutionality of
a limitation of liability for medical malpractice. In approving the major
provisions of Florida's no fault plan, the Florida Supreme Court held
that an adequate substitute remedy must be provided whenever the
legislature abolishes a statutory or long-standing common law right,
unless it can show "an overpowering public necessity for the abolish-
ment of such right, and [unless] no alternative method of meeting such
public necessity can be shown."14  The same court, in another case,'
41
upheld the Florida limitation on recovery for pain and suffering caused
by automobile accidents to certain types of injuries because, in its view,
the entire no fault scheme provided an adequate substitute remedy.
Other states have largely followed the Florida approach; they suggest
that a substitute remedy is required and then hold that, in any event, no
fault constitutes an adequate substitute.
42
136. Civil No. 55527 (D. Idaho, filed Sept., 1975). As this case is unreported,
we rely on an account of its holding in NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 8, at 187,
257.
137. IDAHO CONsT. art. I, § 18. "Courts of justice shall be open to every person,
and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury. . . ." Id.
138. NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 8, at 257. Where the cause of action was not
recognized by the common law, state courts have not hesitated to uphold statutory limits
on recovery. E.g., Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961) (limit
of $15,000 recoverable in an action for violation of Dram Shop Act).
139. N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 18. "All courts shall be open; every person for an in-
jury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation shall have remedy by due course
of law; and right and justice shall be administered without favor, denial, or delay."
140. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
141. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 13-14 (Fla. 1974).
142. E.g., Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589, 522 P.2d 1291 (1974); Pinnick v.
Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592 (1971). In this respect, the state courts have fol-
lowed the United States Supreme Court which, in upholding New York's Workmen's
Compensation system, raised the issue of adequate substitutes in dictum but then de-
clined to decide the question. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201
(1917). The Court indicated, however, that it thought a substitute might be required.
Id. However, in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), the Court unequivocally stated,
"A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law...
Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be taken away
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This general rule that a state legislature may abolish common law
causes of action does not give blanket protection to limitations on the
amount for which doctors may be held liable for medical malpractice.
The rule so far has been applied only to justify the outright elimination
of causes of action that were strongly believed to be contrary to public
policy1 43 or that were to be replaced by a new form of recovery. No one
in North Carolina argues that the right to sue for medical malpractice
should be eliminated outright, and the limitations on liability under
discussion do not contemplate the substitution of another system of
compensation.1 44
The North Carolina Supreme Court has addressed this problem of
legislatively enacted limits on liability only peripherally, when telegraph
and bus companies have attempted to limit their liability for negligently
failing to deliver a message and for losing a passenger's luggage. The
court has upheld these limitations with sweeping language. "[When
the law prescribes a duty with a limitation of liability appendant, the
injured party must take the law as he finds it, and measure his rights
without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed at the will,
or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations."
Id. at 134. The Court later followed this line of decision in Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S.
111 (1929), when it upheld Connecticut's Guest Statute, which barred a passenger in
an automobile from suing the owner or driver.
The New York Court of Appeals has thoroughly considered both viewpoints and
stated in dictum that "[slerious question exists as to whether this 'adequate substitute'
test is any test at all." Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 56, 340 N.E.2d 444,
453, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1, 14 (1975). The Court of Appeals then held that in any event,
automobile no fault insurance legislation met the adequate substitute test. Id. at 57-58,
340 N.E.2d at 454, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 15. A New Jersey lower court apparently stands
alone in unequivocally rejecting the adequate substitute test. 'It held that New Jersey
might abolish outright common law "Heart Balm" causes of action. Magierowski v.
Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534, 121 A.2d 749 (1956).
The abolition of the cause of action has been held not to violate the right to trial
by jury. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 22 (Fla. 1974).
143. E.g., Heart Balm Acts. See Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534, 121
A.2d 749 (1956).
144. No fault systems for compensating victims of medical accidents have been pro-
posed by several writers. E.g., Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U.
PA. L. R1v. 590 (1973); Nuw YoPR REPORT, supra note 8, at 129-37. However, unlike
the case of automobile no fault insurance, even the advocates of medical malpractice no
fault admit that the adoption of such a system would greatly increase the cost of cover-
age. Many more persons would have to be compensated. In addition, administration
of the system would not be made any simpler in the face of the extreme difficulty in
defining and identifying the types of injury that the system would compensate. Unlike
automobile accidents, we lack a satisfactory definition of medical accidents that does not
rest on the concept of negligence. SacREnrARY's REPORT, supra note 11, at 101. In light
of these problems, the Secretary's Commission recommended only that state governments
study and conduct experiments in this area. Id. at 102. Accord, Comment, Compara-
tive Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.L 1141, 1163
(1975).
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accordingly. '145 The North Carolina court has stated in these cases that
the limitation of liability, although contained in the contract between
plaintiff and the company, was authorized and conferred by the Legisla-
ture acting through the Utilities Commission (or its equivalent) when
that agency approved the telegraph company's rates. 146  Thus, the cases
are said to uphold not merely contractual exculpatory clauses,' 47 which
do not raise constitutional questions, but legislatively enacted limitations
on recovery for common law causes of action, which must withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 4
However, a closer examination of these cases suggests that the real
authority for shielding telegraph companies and common carriers from
excessive liability comes not from the general police power but from the
power to prescribe rates for businesses affected with a public interest.
149
Accordingly, little authority exists for the general proposition that a
legislature may limit liability under a common law cause of action
without abolishing the cause of action outright or providing a substitute
remedy.
Due process'5 0 and equal protection' 5' arguments can also be




148. "fO]ne may, under our system, consent to almost any restriction upon
or deprivation of right, but similar restrictions or deprivations, if compelled by govern-
ment, must accord with procedural and substantive due process." Mount St. Mary's
Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 500, 260 N.E.2d 508, 511, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867
(1970).
149. Thomas T. Hardie & Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 190 N.C. 45, 49, 128
S.E. 500, 502 (1925). By prescribing the rates at which Western Union had to accept
and transmit messages, the Legislature limited the cash flow out of which the company
could compensate those injured by its negligent failure to deliver. Accordingly, the Leg-
islature can set limits to the company's liability. Id. Accord, Primrose v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 154 U.S. 1 (1893). This principle has also been applied to common
carriers' liability for lost baggage. Boston & Maine R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97, 116
(1914); Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc., 246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756
(1957); Knight v. Carolina Coach Co., 201 N.C. 261, 159 S.E. 311 (1931). Russ v.
Western Union, 222 N.C. 504, 509, 23 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1943), interprets the Knight
rationale more broadly than this.
150. A limitation on the amount recoverable in a medical malpractice suit arguably
deprives a person of a property right without due process of law. The United States
Supreme Court has held, however, that no one has a property interest in the common
law. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876); see note 142 supra. Even if a state
court were to adopt a contrary holding for the purpose of its own state due process
clause, the proper test for evaluating the due process attack on limitation of liability
would be whether the limitation bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose. See Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1975). A limit on the amount recoverable in a suit over medical malpractice probably
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raised against a liability ceiling. In North Carolina, a federal district
court has stated that the test to be applied in equal protection cases will
vary with the subject matter of the challenged legislation. If it deals
with "economics and social welfare," the classification must be upheld
so long as it has some reasonable basis. 5 2 Surely a limitation on
medical malpractice recoveries would pass muster under this limited
scrutiny. 15 3  The various state no fault statutes, with one exception, 1 4
have survived similar attacks. 55 Significantly, the Idaho court that
rejected, on "access to the court" grounds, the constitutionality of its
state's liability limit, reportedly upheld the statute from equal protection
and due process attacks.15 6
The no fault decisions raise but do not solve the issue whether a
legislature may place upper limits on the amount recoverable for legally
recognized injuries. 5 7  One can argue that since a legislature can
abolish a cause of action outright, it can certainly limit the amount
recoverable under that cause of action. The New York Malpractice
Panel adopted that reasoning and, citing the recent approval by the New
York Court of Appeals 5 ' of that state's no fault act, 159 recommended
would be found to be rationally related to the goal of providing adequate health care
to the citizens of the state.
151. The equal protection objection lies in the fact that the legislature, in deciding
to limit the liability of health care providers for their acts of professional negligence,
is establishing classifications that could be attacked as arbitrary and irrational. See text
accompanying notes 152-53 infra.
152. Gentry v. Uniform Judicial Retirement Sys., 378 F. Supp. 1, 3 (M.D.N.C.
1974). Accord, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). In considering
equal protection attacks on the New York no fault law, the court of appeals rejected
the use of a strict scrutiny test. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d
444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975).
153. A classification that distinguishes medical injuries, for which the amount recov-
erable by plaintiff would be limited, from other injuries, for which the recoveries would
not be limited, is reasonably related to the goal of providing health services to the citi-
zens of the state. A legislature could reasonably find that if the limit were not enacted
malpractice insurance rates would soar, creating a climate in which doctors would not
provide maximum service to the people of the state. See Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
296 So. 2d 9, 17 (Fla. 1974); Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444,
378 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1975).
154. The Illinois no fault statute was found unconstitutional in Grace v. Howlett,
51 Ill. 2d 478, 283 N.E.2d 474 (1972).
155. Montgomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 52, 340 N.E.2d 444, 450, 378 N.Y.S.2d
1, 10 (1975). For a list of all state no fault statutes and the opinions upholding them
see id. at 52 nn.8-9, 340 N.E.2d at 450, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
156. NEw YoRx REPORT, supra note 8, at 257.
157. California has already enacted a limit of $250,000 for intangible expenses in
any recovery for medical malpractice. Ch. 1, § 24.6, [1975] Cal. Laws 2d Extraord. Sess.
158. Mongtomery v. Daniels, 38 N.Y.2d 41, 340 N.E.2d 444, 378 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1975).
159. N.Y. INs. LAw § 670 et seq. (McKinney Supp. 1976).
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that New York limit intangible damages in medical malpractice cases to
$100,000.10 A favorable outcome to the almost certain constitutional
challenge to this law does not seem so certain as the New York group
may believe.
Since the legislature probably cannot constitutionally limit the
amount a plaintiff may recover for the negligence of a physician, the
physician or, more likely, a hospital, may attempt to limit its liability
contractually. Such an attempt is likely to fail in North Carolina. First,
North Carolina is extremely hostile to contractual limitations on liabili-
ty., 1 Secondly, although North Carolina courts have never explicitly
announced that contracts of adhesion 16 2 will be recognized as a distinct
form of contract and given special scrutiny for unconscionability, 16 3 two
recent cases suggest that the North Carolina judiciary is sensitive to
these arguments. 164 In Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Telegraph &
Telephone,"6 5 the North Carolina Court of Appeals invalidated a limita-
tion of liability inserted by Southern Bell in a contract for space in the
Yellow Pages. The court justified its holding with language virtually
identical to the discussion of contracts of adhesion in the landmark case
of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors."6 The Gas House court held that
when a clause in a standardized contract of adhesion was "unreasona-
ble" as a "direct consequence of a real disparity in bargaining power,
.. . [w]e will not enforce the clause as a matter of public policy."'l
The court continued, "He [the contract drafter] cannot in the name of
freedom of contract be heard to insist on enforcement of an unreasona-
ble contract term against one who on any fair appraisal was not free to
160. NEw YoRK REPORT, supra note 8, at 7, 190.
161. "The old principle that one cannot provide by contract against liability for neg-
ligence, applies to every species and degree of negligence or tort." Brown v. Postal Tel.
Co., 111 N.C. 187, 191, 16 S.E. 179, 180 (1892). Later cases upholding the limitation
of liability of a telegraph company specifically held that the limitation was legislatively
and not contractually imposed. Russ v. Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23
S.E.2d 681 (1943). Accord, Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d
389 (1971) (limitation on liability for sale of seeds).
162. See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 629 (1943).
163. North Carolina only added Uniform Commercial Code section 2-302, which
deals with unconscionability, in 1971. N.C. GN. STAT. § 25-2-302 (1975 Cum. Supp.).
We have not discovered any cases interpreting this section in North Carolina.
164. Gore v. George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389 (1971); Gas House,
Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 26 N.C. App. 672, 217 S.E.2d 101 (1975), cert.
granted, 288 N.C. 511 (1975).
165. 26 N.C. App. 672, 217 S.E.2d 101 (1975), cert. granted, 288 N.C. 511 (1975).
166. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
167. Gas House, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 26 N.C. App. 672, 673, 217
S.E.2d 101, 102 (1975), cert. granted, 288 N.C. 511 (1975).
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accept or reject that term."'' 18 If the North Carolina Supreme Court
upholds Gas House, there is good reason to believe that a clause in a
hospital admission form limiting the liability of the hospital and/or the
attending physician would be struck down as contrary to the public
policy of this state.'0 9
California has refused to enforce an agreement to arbitrate im-
posed by a non-profit research hospital as a condition for admission.1
7
1
A California court invalidated that contract not on unconscionability
grounds, however, but in accordance with the doctrine that businesses
affected with a public interest will not be allowed to employ exculpatory
clauses.' 7 ' The court held that the case before it met all of the
traditional requirements for such a business.'
72
Mindful of these problems, the North Carolina Study Commission
voted not to follow 73 the state Medical Society's recommendation for a
legislatively enacted ceiling on the amount an injured patient can recov-
er. 7 4  Instead, the Study Commission recommended that the General
Assembly adopt a system whereby any award greater than $100,0001
71
168. Id. at 675, 217 S.E.2d at 103.
169. The North Carolina Supreme Court extensively and favorably reviewed the
Henningsen decision and the doctrine of unconscionability that it initiated in Gore v.
George J. Ball, Inc., 279 N.C. 192, 182 S.E.2d 389 (1971), but the court declined to
adopt Henningsen because such a holding was not necessary for the disposition of the
case.
170. Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal.
Rptr. 33 (1963).
171. Id.
172. Id. The criteria are as follows: 1. The party seeking exculpation was engaged
in performing a service of great importance and often of practical necessity for the pub-
lic. 2. The party held itself out as willing to perform services for anyone who sought
them. 3. The transaction concerned a business thought suitable for public regulation.
4. The party possessed a decisive preponderance of bargaining power. 5. The clause was
part of a classic standardized contract of adhesion. 6. The person or property of the
purchaser was placed under the control of the seller, subject to the uncontrolled risk of
carelessness by the seller or its agents. 7. The contract made no provision for the pay-
ment of an additional reasonable fee by the purchaser which would protect him from
negligence. Id.
In Fairfax Gas & Supply Co. v. Hadary, 151 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1945) the Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in a case arising in Virginia, suggested that while
complete exculpatory clauses were not allowed in businesses "affected with a public in-
terest," clauses that placed a reasonable maximum limit on recovery might be upheld.
Id. at 941. See generally Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8 (1948).
173. STurDY REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.
174. "Ultimately, the only real relief physicians or other providers of health care
can obtain from the escalating cost of malpractice insurance is for the General Assembly
to place a monetary limit on the amount of money a plaintiff can recover and for which
the physician or provider can be held liable." N.C.M.S. Brochure, supra note 5 (unpag-
inated).
175. Since entering the state in 1956, St. Paul's has paid only three claims of
$100,000 or larger. Raleigh News & Observer, Nov. 10, 1975, at 23, col. 4.
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would be paid for out of a "Patient's Compensation Fund" instead of by
the physician's liability insurance policy." 8 The Fund would be created
and maintained by an annual surcharge levied on all health care provid-
ers who have filed a certificate of financial responsibility in the amount
of $100,000 with the Commissioner of Insurance. 177  The amount of
the surcharge is to be calculated in compliance with actuarial princi-
ples.17 This scheme probably would not encounter the constitutional
problems of an outright limit.1"9
B. Indirect Limitations
Medical malpractice claims seem more complicated and time con-
suming than ordinary cases, both to prepare and to try. Dissatisfaction
with the excessive costs, delays and unprofessionalism of jury trials has
led to many proposals for the creation of alternative forums for the
resolution of malpractice controversies. It is important to note from the
outset that these systems would use the same substantive law of tort
liability as court trials. Unless one believes that juries are inherently
biased toward one party, the decisions of the alternative forums should
be substantially the same as those rendered in jury trials. Only the
speed and expense of producing a decision would be affected.
Therefore, notwithstanding the fervor of their advocates, 8 0 such
alternatives are not worth adopting unless they will significantly cut
down on the time and expense of traditional litigation. Otherwise, they
simply will add another layer of procedure between the instigation of the
claim and its resolution. Fearing this result, the North Carolina Study
Commission voted not to recommend the adoption of any litigation
alternatives.' 8 '
176. STUDY EPORT, supra note 2, at 23, App. VI.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Like the no fault and workmen's compensation systems, the Patient's Com-
pensation Fund would provide relief to the patient equivalent to that which he gave up.
Id.
180. E.g., Averbach, Rz for Malpractice, 19 CLv. ST. L. Rr-v. 20 (1970); Bergen,
Arbitration of Medical Liability, 211 J.A.M.A. 175 (-1970); Lillard, Arbitration of Med-
ical Malpractice Claims, 26 ARB. J. 193 (1971).
181. STUDY REPORT, supra note 2, at 35-38. Preliminary evidence suggests that this
fear is misplaced. See generally Baird, Munsterman & Steven, Alternatives to Litigation,
I. Technical Analysis, in SECRETARY'S REPORT: APPENDIX, supra note 10, at 214;
Rubsamen, The Experience of Binding Arbitration in the Ross-Loos Medical Group, in
id. at 424; NEw YoRK REPORT, supra note 8, at 46. Despite the relative inexpensiveness
of an appeal from screening panels, many plaintiffs do not so appeal. Naw YORK RE-
PoRT at 46. One method for preventing frivolous appeals would be to allow the report
of the panel to be entered as evidence at trial. Unless the losing side could produce
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The most radical departure from the trial system is arbitration.
Ideally, an arbitration award would provide a final and authoritative
outcome for the dispute, much like a trial judgment. For various
reasons, which will be discussed below, this ideal can only be achieved
when the decision to arbitrate is reached voluntarily by the parties, not
imposed on them by state government. Three basic approaches to
medical malpractice arbitration have been adopted so far. First, the
contract providing for membership in a pre-paid, closed-panel medical
services group may contain a clause agreeing to submit all disputes
arising out of the contract, including charges of malpractice, to arbitra-
tion. A second approach, adopted by a group of hospitals in southern
California, allows entering patients to sign an agreement to submit all
disputes to arbitration before being admitted to the hospital. A patient
is not required to sign as a condition of entry. Finally, the Casualty
Indemnity Exchange of Denver, Colorado, issues liability insurance
policies at lower rates to doctors who obtain advance written agreements
from at least ninety percent of their patients to arbitrate medical mal-
practice claims.'8 2 Voluntary agreement by contract to arbitrate is
governed in a majority of states 8" by the Uniform Arbitration Act of
195584 and on the federal level by the United States Arbitration Act.
Both Acts are distinguished from older statutes and from the common
law 86 by the irrevocability of the agreement to submit disputes to
arbitration and by the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate disputes
that have not arisen as of the time of the agreement.187 Both the federal
and the Uniform Acts have withstood all attacks on their constitutionali-
ty.
1 88
significantly different or additional evidence at trial, he might well have his case taken
from the jury by a motion of summary judgment or directed verdict.
182. NEw Yore REPORT, supra note 8, at 210-11; Baird, Munsterman & Stevens,
Alternatives to Litigation, I: Technical Analysis, in SECRETARY'S REPORT: APPENDIX,
supra note 10, at 215.
183. Aksen, Resolving Construction Contract Disputes Through Arbitration, 23
A"n. J. 141, 149-51 (1968).
184. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to .20 (Supp. 1975) (Adopted in 1973).
185. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (1970).
186. See Skinner v. Gaither Corp., 234 N.C. 385, 67 S.E.2d 267 (1951); Annot.,
135 A.LR. 79 (1941).
187. Henderson, Contractual Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbi-
trate Medical Malpractice, 58 VA. L. REv. 947, 949 (1972). Neither act compels a re-
sort to arbitration; they only provide a framework through which parties may arbitrate.
Ordinary contract law governs the application of an arbitration statute and liability
under it. Id. Accord, Skinner v. Gaither Corp., 234 N.C. 385, 67 S.E.2d 267 (1951)
(decided under the old North Carolina Arbitration Act).
188. M. DoMKE, THE LAw AND PRAcTcE OF COMMERCAL ABn'.ATION § 4.02, at
22 (1968); Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 432, 435 (1957). But cf. Opinion of the Justices of the
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The greatest legal problems associated with contractual agreements
to arbitrate are the traditional defenses to the enforcement of any
contract 89-incompetency of one party on account of youth or infirmi-
ty; fraud, duress or mistake in the procurement of the agreement; and
the enforceability of "unconscionable" contracts of adhesion.
Traditionally, contracts entered into by infants are voidable at the
election of the minor unless ratified upon his coming of age. 190 An
agreement to arbitrate disputes is no different,191 and neither "a guardi-
an ad litem [n]or next friend [has] the power to submit for the
infant.' '1 92  The California Supreme Court has held this doctrine
93
inapplicable to agreements to arbitrate medical malpractice claims,1 94 at
least when such an agreement is provided for in a contract for pre-paid,
closed-panel health plans. The court based its holding on the ground
that member doctors in such plans would refuse to treat infants who
could renege on their arbitration awards and that the benefits of both
the pre-paid health plan and the arbitration agreement itself were so
great that they should not be denied to infants.9 '
Charges of fraud, duress or mistake in the procurement of a
contract containing an agreement to arbitrate all disputes arising out of
the contract will sometimes be decided by the arbitration panel.'96 This
doctrine of "separability,"'197 however, does not apply when the charges
are alleged specifically in securing the agreement to arbitrate. In those
cases, the charge will be examined by the courts. 98
Many standardized commercial contracts that are routinely upheld
are in fact contracts of adhesion. 99 But in the medical services area,
any attempt to impose an agreement to arbitrate upon patients as a
Supreme Ct. in Response to a Question Propounded by the Gov. of Del., 283 A.2d 832
(Del. 1971).
189. See Skinner v. Gaither Corp., 234 N.C. 385, 386, 67 S.E.2d 267, 269 (1951).
190. Millsaps v. Estes, 137 N.C. 536, 50 S.E. 227 (1905).
191. M. DomKE, TIM LAW AND PRACTCE OF COMMERCIAL ARmrrATiON § 10.01
(1968).
192. Millsaps v. Estes, 137 N.C. 536, 542, 50 S.E. 227, 229 (1905).
193. The doctrine is codified in CAL. CMVn CODE § 35 (West 1954).
194. Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965) (en
bane).
195. Id.
196. Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir.
1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
197. M. DoMixE, THE LAw AND PRACTICE oF CommEciAL ARBITRATON § 8.02
(1968).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 5.04.
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precondition to entry to a hospital or to treatment by a physician would
probably be condemned. 200 However, in certain cases of elective treat-
ment in which the patient had no immediate and little long term need
for the treatment, a court might find that the agreement to arbitrate was
the product of arms length bargaining. Certainly there is no rule that
agreements to arbitrate in the medical malpractice field are ipso facto
voidable contracts of adhesion.
One possible way around the difficulties of getting patients to sign
arbitration agreements and getting courts to enforce them is for the
legislature to enact a law requiring arbitration regardless of whether the
parties agree. Even without considering the right of trial by jury,201
adding the element of compulsion to the arbitration process fundamen-
tally changes its nature.212  "Voluntary arbitration is a 'private judicial
system,' whereas compulsory arbitration is a public legislative adminis-
trative system."203 Accordingly, the New York Court of Appeals held
that compulsory arbitration of hospital labor disputes requires broader
judicial review of arbitration decisions in order to comport with due
process than under a voluntary arbitration system.204
Compulsory arbitration was adopted by Pennsylvania in 1952205
for all civil actions (except those involving real estate) under $1,000.200
Because this plan provides for a de novo appeal to a jury, it was held not
to violate Pennsylvania's 20 7 constitutional guarantee of trial by jury.208
200. See text accompanying notes 214-16 infra.
201. The arguments that relate to open court guarantees are equally applicable to
the guarantee of trial by jury. Both constitutional provisions insure that certain proce-
dures will be followed in the adjudication of disputes over legal rights. Thus a provision
that survives an open court attack is likely to survive a trial by jury challenge. See text
accompanying notes 214-28 infra.
202. Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 500, 260 N.E.2d 508,
511, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (1970).
203. Barr, The Public Arbitration Panel as an Administrative Agency: Can Com-
pulsory Interest Arbitration Be an Acceptable Dispute Resolution Method in the Public
Sector?, 39 ALBANY L. Rav. 187 (1974-75).
204. Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 508, 260 N.E.2d 508,
516, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 874 (1970). See text accompanying notes 224-28 infra.
205. Comment, Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania-Its Scope, Effect, Appli-
cation, and Limitations in Montgomery and Delaware Counties-A Survey and Analy-
sis, 2 VILL. L. REv. 529 (1957).
206. Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 234, 112 A.2d 625, 626, appeal dismissed,
350 U.S. 858 (1955). The figure today varies from county to county but is much higher
everywhere. PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 30 (Cum. Supp. 1975-76).
207. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not require trial by
jury in state civil actions. Wagner Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Lyndon, 262 U.S: 226, 232 (1923);
Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160 (1894); Walker v.
Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875).
208. PA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 6.
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Nor does limiting the requirement to arbitrate to small claims violate
guarantees of equal protection of the laws. 09 The Pennsylvania plan
allows county courts to provide by rule that either party to the dispute
may elect to have the case decided by a three-member panel of local
lawyers. 210  Either party may appeal the decision of the arbitrators and
receive a de novo jury trial,2 "1 but relatively few litigants avail them-
selves of this right. 12 Evidence suggests that the average time in which
a case reaches final adjudication has been signficantly reduced under
this plan.
213
Other judicial authority for upholding this type of system is hard to
find. The Ohio Supreme Court upheld a system for compulsory arbi-
tration of the value of stock in certain cases, 214 and the United States
Supreme Court has upheld a similar Minnesota statute governing the
amount of recovery under certain fire insurance policies.21 5  In that
case, the Court said:
the procedure by which rights may be enforced and wrongs reme-
died is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control ....
In the exercise of that power, and to satisfy a public need a state
may choose the remedy best adapted, in the legislative judgment, to
protect the interests concerned, provided its choice is not unreason-
able or arbitrary, and the procedure it adopts satisfies the consti-
tutional requirements of reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard.216
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, overturned a provision in the
Illinois no fault law217 that compelled arbitration of all disputes involv-
ing less than $3,000 in damages i.21  The Illinois court apparently
objected not to the postponement of the jury trial right but to the
209. Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955). Pennsylvania's su-
preme court held that the constitution did not state at what stage in the proceedings the
jury trial must be had or that no conditions could be imposed upon the right to demand
the jury trial. Id. at 230, 112 A.2d at 629.
210. PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 30 (Cum. Supp. 1975-76).
211. PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 71 (1973). However, the appealing party must
pay the expenses of arbitration. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that these rela-
tively minor fees were needed to preserve the system by preventing frivolous appeals and
that they did not constitute an unreasonable bar to a jury trial. Application of Smith,
381 Pa. at 233, 112A.2d at 629-30 (1955).
212. See Comment, 2 VILL. L. REv. 529 (1957), supr note 205, at 534.
213. Id.
214. Pittsburgh, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Garrett, 50 Ohio 405, 34 N.E. 493 (1893).
215. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151 (1931).
216. Id. at 158.
217. ILL. Ruv. STAT. ch. 73, § 1065.159 (Supp. 1974).
218. Grace v. Howlett, 51 IM. 2d 478, 490, 283 N.E.2d 474, 480 (1972).
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payment of the arbitrators by the losing party.219
At a minimum, North Carolina might approve a system of prelimi-
nary resort to a nonjury forum. For years Justice of the Peace courts
handed down decisions that could then be appealed to a jury de novo.220
Additionally, compulsory referral of complicated accounts and bounda-
ry disputes221 to a referee before trial is well established in North
Carolina.222 Although referral might more properly be considered,
with the screening panels, as an aid to litigation, it provides an analogy
useful in deciding whether compulsory arbitration would be upheld in
this state.223
Compulsory arbitration without later recourse to a jury trial is so
little favored in the law that ". . . there is a dearth of legal analysis and
precedent in the courts to illuminate the principles to be applied to this
drastic remedy. '224 The New York Court of Appeals, however, upheld
a system for compulsory arbitration of disagreement arising out of the
negotiation of collective bargaining agreements involving employees of
public charitable hospitals.2 5 The decision's impact is limited by the
observation that the subject matter of that arbitration was both unusual
and peculiarly suited to such a system: first, in some states, private
parties have long been subject to compulsory arbitration of their differ-
219. This was held to violate Illinois' constitutional prohibition against "fee officers
in the judicial system." Id. at 478, 283 N.E.2d at 481.
220. Keddie v. Moore, 6 N.C. 41 (1811). The United States Supreme Court cited
this case with approval in upholding a similar system for the District of Columbia. Cap-
ital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13, 25 (1899).
221. There is no indication that the jurisdiction of the referee could not be broad-
ened by the General Assembly. See 1 T. WILSON & J. WILSON, MCINT sH NORTH CAR-
OLiNA PRACrIcnE AND PROcEDuRE § 1391 et seq. (2d ed. 1956).
222. N.C. GmN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 53(a)(2) (1969). Resort Dev. Co. v.
Phillips, 278 N.C. 69, 76, 178 S.E.2d 813, 817-18 (1971) (dictum); Moore v. Whitley,
234 N.C. 150, 66 S.E.2d 785 (1951); State ex rel. Wilson v. Featherstone, 120 N.C.
446, 27 S.E. 124 (1897).
223. Yet another favorable analogy is provided by Board of County Comm'rs v.
George, 182 N.C. 414, 109 S.E. 77 (1921). A statute required Stokes County to reim-
burse its citizens for personal injuries or damage to property caused by dogs. Upon a
finding of actual injury (presumably by the Commissioners) a panel of three freehold-
ers was appointed, and they assessed the amount of damages. The county then paid
the citizen. A subsequent suit by the county recovered damages from the dog owner.
The court did not decide whether this procedure violated the rights of the injured citizen,
but it did hold that the dog owner's rights were not violated by the use of the panel
to assess damages.
224. Mount St. Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 499, 260 N.E.2d 508,
511, 311 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867 (1970).
225. Id. Dicta from cases in other jurisdictions indicate that they would invali-
date such a system. E.g., "Compulsory arbitration without right to have the issue deter-
mined by court action, is invalid." Mengel Co. v. Nashville Paper Prod. & Specialty
Workers Union, 221 F.2d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1955).
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ences in interpreting collective bargaining agreements;226 secondly, set-
ting the conditions of employment of state employees is normally a
function of the legislature acting through the budgetary process. 227  Far
less objection can be raised to the delegation of a legislative power to an
administrative or quasi-administrative forum than to a similar delegation
of a judicial power. 
22
While the constitutionality of compulsory arbitration may be ques-
tioned, states are free to require recourse to expert screening panels
before trial.229  Screening panels are informal devices that use disinter-
ested doctors and lawyers to evaluate the merits of a plaintiffs claim.230
Clearly frivolous claims are eliminated before trial; meritorious plaintiffs
are provided with valuable expert testimony.28' This system, which
originated in Pima County, Arizona, 2 ' has been adopted in several
other jurisdictions2 3 and is widely praised.
234
The Study Commission did not recommend legislation requiring
resort to either arbitration or medical screening panels. Instead, most
of its proposals outside the area of substantive law were concerned with
relatively minor changes in the current trial system. North Carolina
plaintiffs' attorneys invariably use a contingent fee compensation system
to finance malpractice actions. 215 Although other states have moved to
226. Barr, supra note 203, at 383. The United States Supreme Court, in Dorchy
v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286 (1924), held a Kansas compulsory labor arbitration statute un-
constitutional not on procedural due process or jury trial grounds but on the now discred-
ited theory that a state could not interfere with the "freedom of contract" between an
employer and employee unless the business was "affected with a public interest."
227. Barr, supra note 203, at 381.
228. See generally L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTIoN 98-99
(1965). Much of the language of the Mount St. Mary's Hospital decision, however, did
not limit itself to the restricted circumstances discussed in the text. E.g., "There is no
doubt that a legislature may establish a tribunal other than a court to hear and deter-
mine disputes, even where substantial property rights are involved. . . ." Mount St.
Mary's Hosp. v. Catherwood, 26 N.Y.2d 493, 505, 260 N.E.2d 508, 514, 311 N.Y.S.2d
863, 871 (1970).
229. Grove v. Seltzer, 56 N.J. 321, 266 A.2d 301 (1970).
230. See, e.g., Averbach, supra note 12, at 28.
231. Id. at 28-29. In the Pima County plan, plaintiffs must'agree to abandon their
claim if the panel rules that there is no substantial evidence of malpractice. If the panel
does find substantial evidence, then the medical society agrees to cooperate in the prose-
cution of the claim. This cooperation includes furnishing expert witnesses. Id.
232. Id. at 28.
233. E.g., IND. CODE § 16-9.5-9-1 et seq. (Burns Supp. 1975); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 519A:1-10 (Supp. 1973); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 655.04 (1975).
234. E.g., Averbach, supra note 12, at 29; Lillard, Arbitration of Medical Malprac-
tice Claims, 26 ARn. J. 193 (1971).
235. See Part MI infra.
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legislate maximum schedules for this type of recovery,2 30 the North
Carolina Study Commission found no evidence2 7 that the contingent
fee system was abused in this state or that it contributed to the severity
of awards; accordingly, the Commission voted not to consider this
subject.2
3 8
Large lump sum awards designed to compensate an injured plain-
tiff for "future damages" 239 are often awarded to plaintiffs who die well
before these amounts have been spent. The heirs or legatees of the
patient therefore benefit from a windfall, while insurance companies pay
money that is not used for its intended purpose. Following the sugges-
tion of the state Medical Society, 240 the Study Commission proposed
legislation that would authorize the entry of judgments in the form of
periodic payments for future damages when those damages exceed
$100,000.241 As in other states that have enacted similar legislation,242
a court 243 would enter judgment specifiying the recipient of the pay-
ments, the dollar amount thereof,2 "4 the interval between payments and
the period of time over which the payments would be made.248 This
236. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1976). The New York Report
recommended that New York adopt a fee schedule that would allow the attorney forty
percent of awards under $25,000 but only fifteen percent for recoveries in excess of
$100,000. NEW YoRK REPORT, supra note 8, at 7. Varying the percentage of recovery
according to the size of the award is totally contrary to North Carolina practice. See
Part III infra.
237. STUDY REPORT, supra note 2, at 34.
238. Id.
239. "'Future damages' means without limitation damages for future medical treat-
ment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or future pain
and suffering of the judgment creditor." STUDY REPORT, supra note 2, Appendix VII,
at 1.
240. N.C.M.S. brochure, supra note 5.
241. STmUY REPORT, supra note 2, Appendix VII.
242. E.g., CAL. Civ. PRo. CODE § 667.7 (West Supp. 1976). The New York Re-
port recommends such a system for all awards of future damages in excess of $50,000.
NEw Yo.K REPORT, supra note 8, at 198-99. Curiously the Report concluded only that
such changes "might" significantly reduce insurance costs. Id. at 199.
243. Inasmuch as juries would find the total amount of damages, the authors believe
that a simpler and more logical system would be for the court to require the jury to
itemize its award for damages. Conceivably this would force juries to examine the un-
derpinnings of their total awards as well.
244. The New York Report recommends that in appropriate cases the defendant
(such as a hospital) guarantee free treatment instead of monetary compensation. NEW
Yoan REPORT, supra note 8, at 199. Such a proposal might result in greater emphasis
upon the physical rehabilitation of injured patients than that currently given. The Secre-
tary's Report urged that much greater attention be given to rehabilitation. SECRETARY'S
REPORT, supra note 11, at 102.
245. All payments except for lost earnings would cease upon the plaintiff's death.
Presumably, awards would be in "real" dollars and not the discounted dollars now used.
Since an insurance company will save no money under this system unless it would other-
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delay in the payment of damage awards could well result in an absolute
reduction in their total amount, thus helping to lower medical malprac-
tice insurance rates.
For years, doctors have complained that patients may attract large
headlines by filing million dollar malpractice suits, yet go all but un-
noticed when they quietly settle for a thousand dollars after the fanfare
dies down. Aside from needlessly damaging a doctor's reputation in the
community, publication of these inflated claims may create a climate of
public opinion that makes it likely that juries will overcompensate
victims of actual negligence. Elimination of the ad damnum clause
therefore might indirectly limit the size of jury awards for medical
malpractice. Regardless of the merits of these charges, the ad damnum
clause in a complaint serves little legal function today, and constitutes a
needless irritant to the medical profession. 246  Although its abolition
may have no effect on the size of awards, the Study Commission's
proposal to eliminate it from pleadings2 47 can give no cause for regret.
Summary
The Legislative Study Commission showed little appetite for rec-
ommending fundamental procedural, substantive or remedial changes in
North Carolina's medical malpractice law. The Commission did not
recommend legislation imposing an absolute limit on physicians' liability
for negligent treatment. Nor did it recommend mandatory arbitration.
Either proposal would have faced strong constitutional challenges of
uncertain result but, in any event, neither appears to be a necessary
reform. The Commission also drew back from the less controversial
proposal of requiring all medical malpractice claims to be referred to
expert evaluative panels. This measure apparently has met with quali-
fied success wherever it has been adopted, and the Commission's refusal
to recommend it was perhaps unwise. The measures that the Commis-
sion did recommend for adoption in the areas of remedies and proce-
dure are non-controversial, and are unlikely to have a major impact on
malpractice awards or insurance rates.
wise have paid out large awards for future damages to persons who then die before they
need this compensation, and since virtually no awards of this large size have been
granted in North Carolina, adoption of this plan is unlikely to save insurance companies
much money. Doctors will still have to contribute to a pool that would protect them
in the event of a high award. Perhaps this amount will be less than the doctor's current
insurance premiums.
246. SEcLrrARY's REPORT, supra note 11, at 38; NEw YoRn REPORT, supra note 8,
at 201.
247. STuDY REPORT, supra note 2, at 32-33.
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The ineffectiveness of the proposed measures may prompt physi-
cians to insert limitations on their liability or agreements to arbitrate
disputes into their contracts with patients. Unless the physicians who
write such contracts are scrupulous in not insisting on these terms as
pre-conditions for treatment, these clauses will be struck down as uncon-
scionable and contrary to public policy.
Accordingly, even if all of the Study Commission's procedural and
remedial proposals are enacted, a basic dilemma in the medical malprac-
tice area will remain. Almost all of the measures that promise to be
effective in limiting awards are also likely to involve serious unfairness
to the plaintiff-patient. For this reason, the Commission's failure to
recommend the one proposal that is both fair and at least partially
effective, the medical screening panel, is doubly unfortunate.
JI. SuRvEY oF NORTH CAROLINA LAWYERS
As part of its study of the malpractice problem in North Carolina,
the North Carolina Law Review conducted a survey of five hundred
randomly selected lawyers throughout the state. The cooperation of
those solicited far exceeded our hopes, as 223 of the 500 returned their
questionnaires, many of them including very helpful comments and
suggestions. While this survey quite clearly does not meet strict scientif-
ic methodological standards, we believe that it is at least suggestive of
the unique malpractice experience of North Carolina. We include as an
appendix to this comment the results of that survey, along with a brief
discussion of the conclusions that we have drawn from it.
The results suggest that lawyers in North Carolina do screen out
many non-meritorious allegations of medical malpractice before any
claim is ever made. Of the 397 claims presented to the malpractice bar
that were revealed in our survey,248 seventy per cent (284) were reject-
ed. By far the most common explanation given for the rejection of a
claim was that the lawyer perceived no liability (166 of 293). Further-
more, a significant number of claims were rejected because the potential
client had suffered no damage (26 of 293). Consequently, despite the
comment by one respondent that "[mly opinion is that over half the
malpractice suits which are, in fact, brought, should not have been
248. We defined the malpractice bar as those attorneys who have had two or more
medical malpractice claims presented to them since January 1, 1975. The malpractice
bar received ninety-three percent of all claims represented in the survey. We were sur-
prised to find that the malpractice bar's geographical distribution, firm size and percent
of claims accepted were substantially equivalent to those of other respondents.
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brought. . ," the survey results suggest that, at least in North Caroli-
na, the common assertion that the legal profession tends to screen out
non-meritorious allegations seems reasonable.249
Apart from lack of perceived liability, the most common justifica-
tion advanced for rejecting claims involved economic factors, such as the
insufficient size of the claims (51 of 293). This result tends to support
the widespread belief that the negligence liability insurance system
effectively denies recovery for relatively minor injuries caused by medi-
cal malpractice. Unless the recovery is potentially large, it is simply too
expensive for a victim of malpractice to pursue his claim.25 0 This
survey sheds no light upon the other side of the small claim controversy,
i.e., whether many non-meritorious small claims are settled for nuisance
value.
The fact that only ten of 293 claims were rejected because of the
running of the statute of limitations or a similar legal bar suggests that
the current statute of limitations does not often interfere with malprac-
tice claims. As was noted in Part II, the Study Commission has
recommended that North Carolina drastically shorten the current statute
of limitations for medical malpractice cases. Such a shortened statute
might bar many more claims than does the present one. Several respon-
dents feel strongly that, as one put it, "a change back to a shorter and
non 'date of discovery' statute of limitations would be of distinct and
unfair advantage to the defendant-doctors." These comments reinforce
our earlier conclusion that the Study Commission's proposal in this area
should be subjected to particularly careful scrutiny by the General
Assembly.
Several respondents also confirmed our earlier suggestion that
judges and juries are often not qualified to evaluate medical malpractice
claims. As one noted, "The difference [between medical malpractice
cases and other negligence cases] is that we all drive automobiles and
we can recognize acts of negligence on the part of another driver. The
public has very little understanding of medical practice and tends to
equate failure to recover with malpractice." This respondent empha-
sized that this lack of understanding justifies the rule that plaintiff must
establish the standard of care. It also justifies a hard look at alterna-
249. Some of the claims rejected as non-meritorious may later have been accepted
by other lawyers, but since these results are based only on the responses from the "mal-
practice bar" it seems unlikely that many claims would fall into this category.
250. It is not clear whether the common use of the contingent fee contributes to
this result.
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fives to the tort law liability insurance system of handling malpractice
allegations.
Finally, the responses to the survey revealed a widespread and deep
conviction that the "conspiracy of silence" among physicians constitutes
a major problem in North Carolina. Nearly half of the respondents
who identified a peculiar advantage for either side in medical malprac-
tice cases identified the conspiracy of silence (36 of 78), and several
responses that identified the "locality rule" as an advantage to the
defendant-doctor could have fairly been added to that group, as they
emphasized the existence of loyalty among medical colleagues. The
following comments are typical:
During more than 27 years that I have practiced law, I have had
several persons come in with malpractice claims of a rather minor
nature, but in each instance, the doctors closed ranks in support
of their negligent colleague.
In North Carolina the medical profession is very self-protective.
It is difficult to find a local expert no matter how egregious the
local practice.
I could find no doctors in the community willing to express an
opinion, [so I] had to go out of state to the head of a Special
Department at [University cited] who indicated that the defendant
was negligent.
Medical people are very reluctant to testify against their own, so
most cases are unsuccessful.
These results suggest that a liberal locality rule is appropriate in mal-
practice cases, and that stronger measures to police the medical profes-
sion may be necessary.
CONCLUSION
This comment draws three principal conclusions concerning medi-
cal malpractice in North Carolina. First, the substantive doctrines
applicable to malpractice cases in North Carolina are not unfair to
doctors and other health care providers. The state's courts have been
extremely cautious in adopting new interpretations of the law in this
field. Nonetheless, the Legislative Study Commission's proposed codifi-
cation of many of these substantive doctrines in an attempt to prevent
the adoption of the vastly more liberal principles established in some
other states is a laudable effort. The Legislature, however, should be
alert to proposed technical changes in these doctrines that, in theory,
could unfairly aid negligent physicians.
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Secondly, radical changes in the remedies and procedures of mal-
practice litigation are likely to face constitutional challenges of uncertain
success. Thirdly, the perceptions of doctors and lawyers on the subject
of medical malpractice vary widely in North Carolina. Judging from
the proposals of the North Carolina Medical Society, the state's doctors
view unscrupulous lawyers as prime contributors to the malpractice
problem. As revealed by our survey, lawyers see themselves in an
opposite light while, unsurprisingly, holding an equally uncomplimen-
tary view of doctors. The most glaring inequity in medical malpractice
law, the lawyers in our survey reported, is a "conspiracy of silence" that
allows significant numbers of negligent doctors to escape liability. The
survey also reveals that, far from encouraging patients to sue on imagi-
nary or fradulently conceived injuries, North Carolina lawyers decline to
represent most of the would-be medical malpractice plaintiffs who come
to them. We can only hope that, even if the proposals made by the
Commission turn out to have little effect on the medical malpractice
problem in North Carolina, the debate they are sure to spark will help
bring doctors and lawyers to a better understanding of their roles in
solving this dilemma.
ADDENDUM
As this comment went to press, the North Carolina General As-
sembly passed three bills25' that, for the most part, incorporated the
recommendations of the Legislative Study Commission. 252  The Legis-
lature enacted without significant changes the Commission's recommen-
dations as to the extension of the present "good samaritan!' law,253 the
elimination of the ad damnurn clause,254 and the establishment of a self-
insurance plan for the University of North Carolina and its medical
affiliates.255 The General Assembly also followed the Commission by
not enaoting legislation on the subjects of burden of proof, counterclaim
procedures, attorneys' contingent fees, 256 limitations on recovery or
251. Law of May 10, 1976, ch. 976; Law of May 12, 1976, ch. 977; Law of May
13, 1976, ch. 978.
252. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
253. The Commission's proposal that health care" providers who supply emergency
care outside of a hospital to persons with whom they previously had no doctor-patient
relationship be protected from liability for medical malpractice except in cases of gross
negligence was enacted as Law of May 12, 1976, ch. 977 § 4.
254. See text accompanying notes 246-47 supra. The changes were enacted as Law
of May 12, 1976, ch. 977 § 5.
255. Law of May 10, 1976, ch. 976.
256. See text accompanying notes 235-38 supra.
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liability, 257 and physicians' screening panels and arbitration.2 8  The
General Assembly rejected the Commission's proposals to limit the
collateral source rule 259 and to provide for the periodic payment of
future damages.260 Significant changes were made by the Legislature in
the Commission's proposals concerning the statute of limitations,6 1 the
codification of the standard of care2 2 and the "Patients' Compensation
Fund. 2
63
The new legislation created a major -and welcome exception to the
Commission's proposed reduction of the statute of limitations for medi-
cal malpractice actions from ten years to between three and four years,
depending on the circumstances.2 64 Although that general scheme was
adopted,265 when the cause of action stems from the failure of a physi-
cian to remove a "foreign object, which has no therapeutic or diagnostic
purpose or effect '' 266 from the patient's body, the patient may commence
an action within one year of the discovery of the object, up to a
maximum of ten years after "the last act of the defendant giving rise to
the cause of action. '2 67  The Legislature rejected the attempt to make
this shortened period of limitations applicable to children over the age of
seven.268 Under the new law, a minor may bring suit anytime within
the new period or until he reaches the age of nineteen, whichever choice
provides the longer period. 69
The codification of the standard of care required of physicians
proposed by the Commission contained the potential for unwarranted
limitations on the rights of injured patients.2 70 The General Assembly
added language to the Commission's proposed formulation that does
not relieve, and may exacerbate, this potential. The standard adopted
by the General Assembly provides that a physician must conform to the
"standards of practice among members of the same health care profes-
257. See text accompanying notes 135-60 supra.
258. See text accompanying notes 180-234 supra.
259. See text accompanying notes 104-13 supra.
260. See text accompanying notes 239-45 supra.
261. See text accompanying notes 65-90 supra.
262. See text accompanying notes 23-46 supra.
263. See text accompanying notes 175-79 supra.
264. See text accompanying notes 65-90 supra.
265. Law of May 12, 1976, ch. 977 §§ 1-2.
266. Law of May 12, 1976, ch. 977 § 2. This amendment alleviates the problem
discussed in the text accompanying note 86 supra.
267. Id.
268. See STuDY REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
269. Law of May 12, 1976, ch. 977 § 3.
270. See text accompanying notes 40-46 supra.
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sion with similar training and experience situated in the same or similar
communities ... .,"271 If applied literally, this language would allow a
doctor with inadequate training to escape liability. Consequently this
standard of care is potentially far below that of the traditional oneY.7
2
The General Assembly left the essence of the proposed "Patients'
Compensation Fund' 273 intact while cleaning up potential loose ends in
the scheme.274  The plan is now entitled the "North Carolina Health
Care Excess Liability Fund,"275, and it protects physicians only for
awards dn excess of $100,000 but less than $2,000,000.211
On the whole, the Legislature acted cautiously and responsibly.
Drastic changes in the North Carolina law of medical malpractice can
easily wait for at least another year.
Richard A. Simpson
E. Thomas Watson
271. Law of May 12, 1976, ch. 977 § 4 (new language emphasised).
272. See, e.g., Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 521-22, 88 S.E.2d 762, 765 (1955).
See text accompanying notes 23-28 supra.
273. See text accompanying notes 175-79 supra.
274. Law of May 13, 1976, ch. 978.
275. Id.
276. Law of May 13, 1976, ch. 978 § 3.
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APPENDIX
RESULTS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
SURVEY OF LAWYERS
1. Total complete responses: 223 of 500
2. Number that have handled one or more medical malpractice claims since
January 1, 1975: 93
3. Number that have not handled any malpractice claims: 130
4. Number of Attorneys who handled malpractice
claims in the responding firm: 0 1 2 3 4 or more
Number of respondents: 130 44 29 14 6
5. Average size of all firms: 5.7
Number of firms in North Carolina's eight largest cities: 105 or 47%
Average size of firms in the eight largest cities: 8.2
Number of firms in other cities: 118 or 53%
6. We define the "malpractice bar" as those attorneys who have had two
or more medical malpractice claims presented to them since January 1, 1975.
Number of respondents who belong to the malpractice bar: 85
Average size of their firms: 4.6
Number in eight largest cities: 39 or 46%
Number in other cities: 46 or 54%
7. The malpractice bar received 397 of the 427 claims reported in the
survey (93%).
It rejected 284 or 70%
It accepted 113 or 30%
8. For all respondents:
Number of claims brought to
personal attention 0 1 2 3 4 5 6-9 10 or more
Number of respondents 107 30 31 21 13 9 6 5
Total number of claims
represented 0 30 62 63 52 45 46 129
9. Total number of claims presented: 427
number rejected: 301 or 70.5%
number accepted: 126 or 29.5%
10. Reasons for rejecting claims:
1=no perceived liability
2=potential client suffered no damage
3-economic reasons such as claim too small
4-running of statute of limitations or similar legal bar
5=conflict of interest
6=other
Reason 1 2 3 4 5 6
Number of respondents 166 25 51 10 12 29 -293 (this
total differs from total claims rejected








C=sliding contingent fee dependent on the stage of settlement
D=sliding contingent fee dependent on the size of the award
E=other
Type of Charge A B C D E
Number of respondents 7 31 22 2 2 = 64 (not every
attorney responded to
this question)
Average fixed hourly fee: $48
Most frequent fixed contingent fee: 33%
Most frequent sliding contingent fee: 25% if settled before trial, 33 1/3%
after
12. The respondents were asked to identify the legal doctrines that they
believed worked to the peculiar advantage of plaintiff or defendant in medi-
cal malpractice cases in a way not found in other personal injury suits.
Seventy-eight identified at least one advantage. Several of these advantages
were not legal doctrines.
Conspiracy of silence aids defendant: 36
Locality Rule aids defendant: 11
Burden of proof/standard of care aids defendant: 7
No special advantage to either side: 7
Informed consent aids plaintiff: 3
Reputation of doctor aids defendant: 3
Res ipsa loquitur aids plaintiff: 1; aids defendant: 1
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